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Public-law litigation by state governments plays an increasingly prominent
role in American governance. Although public lawsuits by state governments
designed to challenge the validity or shape the content ofnational policy are not
new, such suits have increased in number and salience over the last few
decades-especially since the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s. Under the
Obama and Trump Administrations, such suits have taken on a particularly
partisan cast, "red" states have challenged the Affordable Care Act and
President Obama's immigration orders, for example, and "blue" states have
challenged President Trump's travel bans and attempts to roll back prior
environmental policies. As a result, longstanding concerns about state litigation
as a form of national policymaking that circumvents ordinary lawmaking
processes have been joined by new concerns that state litigation reflects and
aggravates partisan polarization.
This Article explores the relationship between state litigation and the
polarization ofAmerican politics. As we explain, our federal system can mitigate
the effects ofpartisan polarization by taking some divisive issues off the national
agenda, leaving them to be solved in state jurisdictions where consensus may be
more attainable-both because polarization appears to be dampened at the state
level and because political preferences are unevenly distributed geographically.
State litigation can both help and hinder this dynamic. The available evidence
suggests that state attorneys general (who handle the lion's share of state
litigation) are themselves fairly polarized, as are certain categories of state
litigation. We map out the different ways states can use litigation to shape
national policy, linking each to concerns about polarization. We thus distinguish
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between "vertical" conflicts, in which states sue to preserve their autonomy to
go their own way on divisive issues, and "horizontal" conflicts, in which
different groups of states vie for control of national policy. The latter, we think,
will tend to aggravate polarization. But we concede-and illustrate-that it will
often be difficult to separate out the vertical and horizontal aspects ofparticular
disputes and that in some horizontal disputes the polarization costs of state
litigation may be worth paying.
We argue, moreover, that state litigation cannot be understood in a vacuum
but must be assessed as part of a broader phenomenon in American law: our
reliance on entrepreneurial litigation to develop and enforce public norms. In
this context, state attorneys general often play roles similar to "private attorneys
general, " such as class action lawyers or public interest organizations. And
states, with their built-in systems of democratic accountability and internal
checks and balances, compare well with other entrepreneurial enforcement
vehicles in a number of respects. Nevertheless, state litigation efforts may not
always account well for divergent preferences and interests within the broad
publics that the states represent, and this deficiency becomes particularly
important in politically polarized times. Although our account ofstate litigation
is, on the whole, a positive one, we caution that state attorneys general face a
significant risk of backlash by other political actors, and by courts, if state
litigation is (or is perceived to be) a bitterly partisan affair.
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Introduction
This Article explores two highly salient phenomena in American
politics and seeks to better understand the relationship between them. The
first is the advent, largely over the past few decades, of high profile public-
law litigation by state attorneys general (AGs) acting on behalf of state
governments and citizens-the sort of thing that Texas Attorney General
Greg Abbott meant when he described a typical workday as, "I go into the
office, I sue the federal government and I go home."' Such cases include red-
state challenges to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Obama
Administration's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans program
(DAPA), and "blue-state" challenges to the Bush Administration's
1. Sue Owen, Greg Abbott Says He Has Sued Obama Administration 25 Times, POLITIFACT
(May 10, 2013), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2013/may/1 0/greg-abbott/greg-abbott-
says-he-has-sued-obama-administration-/ [https://perma.cc/NL3R-BRTW].
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environmental policies and the Trump Administration's travel bans. Yet state
AGs' influence over national policy extends beyond those well-known
examples. It also includes significant increases in amicus curiae filings by
state governments, multistate litigation by groups of AGs working together
to combat questionable business practices,2 as well as state efforts to enforce
federal law in ways that may deviate from the national Executive's priorities. 3
State AGs are playing a pivotal role in some of the most important national
political debates of the day, and they are doing so largely through
entrepreneurial litigation.
The second phenomenon is political polarization. Americans are more
divided today along partisan and ideological lines than they have been for
some time.4 This polarization has important consequences, rendering national
politics unusually contentious and often undermining our capacity for self-
governance. It may cause legislative gridlock, prompting unilateral
presidential action. At other times, polarization can lead to more extreme
national legislation.
State public-law litigation, especially in its most recent manifestations,
seems at first glance to be a symptom of the broader polarization in national
politics.' It is no accident that AG Abbott-a Republican-made his
comment about suing the federal government during the Obama
Administration. Now that the political tables have turned, the homepage for
the Democratic Attorneys General Association reads, in large orange font,
"Democratic Attorneys General are the first line of defense against the new
administration." 6 These partisan divides play out across the policy spectrum.
For much of the last decade, for example, coalitions of blue states committed
to stricter environmental safeguards have litigated to prod the federal
Environmental Protection Agency to more stringently regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases.' Over the same period, red-state coalitions have likewise
litigated to prevent such regulation.' Similarly, red- and blue-state coalitions
2. See infra section II(B)(4).
3. See infra section II(B)(5).
4. See infra subpart I(A).
5. See, e.g., Ben Christopher, For Cahifornia Attorney General, Suing Trump Again and Again
Is a Team Sport, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.dailynews.com/2017/11/30/for-
california-attorney-general-suing-trump-again-and-again-is-a-team-sport/ [https://perma.cc/F2A7-
SMiHP] (describing blue-state suits against the Trump Administration); Alan Neuhauser, State
Attorneys General Lead the Charge Against President Donald Trump, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-10-27/state-attorneys-general-lead-the-
charge-against-president-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/37L7-62MQ] (describing blue-state suits
against the Trump Administration and red-state suits against the Obama Administration); Owen,
supra note 1 (describing red-state suits against the Obama Administration).
6. DEMOCRATIC ATr'YS GEN. ASS'N (Feb. 9, 2018), https://democraticags.org/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180201061037/https://democraticags.org/].
7. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 509 (2007).
8. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (granting application for stay of
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confronted one another over the constitutionality of the ACA's individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion.' And state amicus curiae filings in the
same-sex marriage litigation likewise reflect a passionate red/blue divide
over the pace of social change with respect to sexual orientation and family
relationships."o In many instances, state public-law litigation is a vehicle for
expressing the same divisions that convulse American politics generally.
As state litigation has grown in volume and prominence, it has drawn
more attention in both the academic literature and the popular press. Much of
that attention has been negative. 1 At least since the multistate tobacco
litigation of the 1990s, critics have argued that state suits may effectively
result in national lawmaking by settlement, coercing defendants and
circumventing federal lawmaking processes.12 But new lines of critique have
EPA's rule in petition filed by twenty-nine states); Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, U.S.
Supreme Court Blocks Obama's Clean Power Plan, SC. AM. (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-supreme-court-blocks-obama-s-clean-power-plan/
[https://perma.cc/NJ5V-DZFE] (noting that "coal producer West Virginia and oil producer Texas,"
along with "several major business groups," led the effort).
9. Compare Brief of the States of Maryland, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, the District of Columbia, and the
Virginia Islands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(No. 11-398), with Brief for State Respondents, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-
398) (filed on behalf of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
That the great State of Iowa appears twice in these citations is not a typo: the case divided the
Attorney General and the Governor, who appeared on different sides.
10. Compare, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-
574), Brief of the State of Hawaii as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), Brief of Massachusetts, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-
574), and Brief of the State of Minnesota as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (all supporting the right of same-
sex couples to marry), with Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Alabama in Support of Respondents at
1, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), Brief of Louisiana, Utah,
Texas, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and West Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), and Brief of South Carolina as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556, 14-562,
14-571, 14-574) (all rejecting a right to same-sex marriage).
11. E.g., William H. Pryor, Jr., Comment, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 604, 607 (2001); Professor
John Langbein, Panel Two: The Politics and Economics of Government-Sponsored Litigation
(June 22, 1999), in MANHATTAN INST., REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE OF
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LITIGATION, https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/micsl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9N9U-3FQ9].
12. See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 11, at 608 ("The purpose of the tobacco litigation ... was to
establish through the action of several states a national policy that is properly reserved to state
legislatures and to Congress in the exercise of its enumerated powers.").
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emerged in more recent years, suggesting links between AG litigation and
trends in partisanship and polarization. Critics contend that AGs are
abandoning their traditional role "as representatives of their states," in which
the goal of litigation was to vindicate the long-term, institutional interests of
states qua states. 13 Rather than focusing on threats to state autonomy, AGs
today can be found pushing for more federal regulation1 4 or supporting claims
"of individuals as opposed to the states themselves.""s And, as noted, they
often are doing so in partisan clusters rather than banding together as states
to promote state interests in a politically neutral manner. James Tierney, a
former Maine AG and leading observer on these matters, worries "that the
AGs become seen as one more lawyer ... on the make, and that undercuts
the credibility of the office itself.""
We have some sympathy for those critiques, but we think the picture is
far more complicated than critics acknowledge-in part because the concept
of "state interests" is itself complicated. To understand state litigation, it
helps to situate it within broader theories of federalism. When most people
think of federalism, they imagine "vertical" conflicts between the states and
the federal government, conflicts in which states typically are resisting
assertions of federal power so as to maximize their own regulatory autonomy.
But our federal system also addresses "horizontal" conflicts in which
powerful states (or groups of states) attempt to impose their will on others.
Vertical conflicts are, for the most part, about who decides-the states or the
federal government. Horizontal conflicts are about what policies will prevail.
From this perspective, the critiques of state litigation are easy to
understand. When states challenge federal policy in vertical cases, they are
performing their traditional role in a federal system-throwing off the federal
yoke so that they can govern themselves. To the extent that state AGs argue
in favor of federal law in such cases, they look like traitors to the cause.
Horizontal cases, similarly, appear to be at odds with the states' shared
interest in autonomy. When state AGs argue in favor of individual claims of
constitutional right, for example, or use federal law to reform widespread
business practices, they seem to be vindicating their home states' regulatory
interests-interests that tend to track partisan divisions-at a cost to the
broader institutional interests of the states as such.
This contrast between vertical and horizontal conflicts is a helpful frame
for considering state public-law litigation. But the line between such
conflicts-and between states' institutional and regulatory interests-is often
fuzzy and contested. As we explain, many seemingly vertical conflicts have
13. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 200 (2015).
14. Id. at 30-31.
15. Id. at 200-01.
16. Neuhauser, supra note 5 (quoting former Maine AG, James Tierney).
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horizontal aspects and vice versa. For regulatory challenges that cannot be
solved without collective action-certain environmental issues, for
example-pro-regulatory states have little choice but to push for nationwide
solutions. In such circumstances, states' institutional and regulatory interests
merge, and states exercise their sovereignty by appealing to federal power.
Things look different to anti-regulatory states, and those disagreements will
often play out along partisan lines. It does not follow, however, that the state
AGs on either side of the case are putting politics before state interests.
Likewise, under our contemporary model of federalism, states have an
interest not only in doing their own thing but also in participating in national
politics-an interest that may aggravate horizontal conflict.
State litigation must also be viewed in the evolving context of public-
law litigation generally in American law. Our legal system is exceptional in
its reliance on litigation and courts to resolve conflicts and articulate policies
that, in other systems, would fall into political or bureaucratic channels."
And rather than rely exclusively on enforcement by the national Executive,
federal law frequently authorizes entrepreneurial litigation by private
attorneys general. When state AGs enforce federal law, they play a similar
entrepreneurial role to class action attorneys or public interest organizations.
The same thing is true when state AGs rely on their own state laws but
cooperate to secure nationwide judgments or settlements that impose a de
facto national regulatory solution on a particular industry.
An important response to criticisms of state litigation, then, is to ask
"compared to what?" When states sue to enforce the Clean Air Act or the
securities laws, or to challenge the ACA or the Trump travel bans, they are
playing a similar role to the Sierra Club, the ACLU, or class action plaintiffs'
lawyers. If states were precluded from bringing such suits, their private
analogs would remain. Yet, as we explain, there are good reasons-grounded
in democratic accountability and in state governments' unique institutional
perspectives-to prefer state litigation to purely private mechanisms for
aggregating diffuse interests.
Part I of this Article offers a sketch of polarization in the federal and
state governments, tracing the relationship between polarization, national
policymaking, and policy autonomy at the state level. We suggest that state
autonomy can sometimes be a "safety valve" for polarized conflict at the
national level. Part II then turns to state litigation. It charts the institutional
development of state AGs' offices and the expansion of doctrinal and
statutory rights to sue, which have helped state AGs emerge as a particularly
powerful group of lawyers. We then map the different sorts of claims that
states use to shape national policy.
17. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001).
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Part III turns to the relationship between state litigation and polarization.
Few scholars have sought to study polarization in the work of state AGs, but
the available evidence suggests that state litigation is indeed becoming more
"political" in the sense that Democratic and Republican AGs increasingly are
pursuing different causes or are lining up on opposite sides of the same cases.
The impact on our broader politics, however, will often turn on the nature of
a given lawsuit. We use the distinction between vertical and horizontal
conflicts as a framework for normative assessment of state public-law
litigation in an era of intense political polarization. Finally, we take up the
comparative question in Part IV, situating state litigation within the broader
phenomenon of public-law litigation as a mode of American governance.
Although we think suits by state AGs compare favorably to other
mechanisms of aggregate litigation, we warn that overly aggressive state
public-law litigation may result in a judicial or political backlash that might
undermine the benefits of this valuable institutional mechanism.
I. Polarization and Federalism
Contemporary American politics displays a level of political
polarization that, while hardly unprecedented, is significantly greater than
anything in recent memory." For decades, American political scientists
lamented the lack of clear programmatic differences between the major
political parties; that state of affairs, they complained, deprived American
voters of a meaningful choice at election time.1 9 The present era thus plays
out the old adage, "Be careful what you wish for." (Alternatively, it embodies
the Chinese curse: "May you live in interesting times.") American politics-
and the underlying society-finds itself divided between quite different
18. For an accessible overview of the major characteristics of today's polarization, see Nolan
McCarty, What We Know and Don't Know About Our Polarized Politics, WASH. POST (Jan. 8,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/08/what-we-know-and-
dont-know-about-our-polarized-politics/?noredirect-on&utmterm=.edff6d7795a7
[https://perma.cc/DF6L-6ZFG]. For more extended treatments, see Michael Barber & Nolan
McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in AM. POL. SCI. ASS'N, NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 38 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013); RONALD
BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: How EXTREME PARTISANSHIP HAS PARALYZED
WASHINGTON AND POLARIZED AMERICA (2007); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTIEN, IT'S
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH
THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 43-58 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on
Political Parties, AM. POL. SCI. REv., Sept. 1950, at 18-19; see also DAVID A. HOPKINS, RED
FIGHTING BLUE: How GEOGRAPHY AND ELECTORAL RULES POLARIZE AMERICAN POLITICS 78-
79 (2017) (discussing the APSA report). Later on, political scientists worried that the parties were
dying out. See id. at 84-95. They weren't. The cycles of social scientists' fears suggest that current
predictions about the necessarily enduring nature of polarization should also be taken with a grain
of salt. We are thus partial to the prediction that Marc Hetherington and Thomas Rudolph offer:
"Things Will Probably Get Better, but We Are Not Sure How." MARC J. HETHERINGTON &
THOMAS J. RUDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON WON'T WORK 212 (2015).
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conceptions of the good life, with strong and contrary implications for
government regulation, fiscal policy, and individual rights.2 0 The temperature
of political debate has called into question whether our national political
institutions can mediate and resolve these conflicts. And these changes in
political climate have affected the weather at the U.S. Supreme Court,
influencing both the sorts of cases brought before the Justices and the types
of parties that bring them.
For students of American federalism, there is a certain irony to all this.
A decade ago, prominent voices in the federalism literature took the position
that American federalism is meaningless and unnecessary because American
society lacks the kind of basic divisions that make federalism necessary in,
say, Canada or Iraq.21 This line of thought surely represented the
conventional wisdom in terms of its basic assumptions, even if not everyone
accepted the conclusion that America's federal structure could safely be
junked.22 Scholars looking to defend federal structures were left searching for
glimmers and vestiges of state identity that might sustain autonomous
subnational institutions.23 The question now, by contrast, sometimes seems
to be whether Americans can find sufficient common ground to move
forward together on common problems.24 Federalism, we suggest, can help.
A. Polarization in National Politics
The Democratic and Republican Parties are more polarized today than
they have been in decades-maybe more than a century, according to some
20. It may also be the case that participants in American political debate are less willing to
bracket disagreements about the nature of the good life than they once were. The rights-based
liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin-which was committed, in principle at least, to
bracketing such disagreements-seems far less ascendant on the American Left than it was. See,
e.g., Michael Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3-4, 8-9 (Michael Sandel ed.,
1984) (discussing the priority of the "right" over the "good" in late-twentieth-century liberalism).
The traditional Right, of course, was never committed to this sort of bracketing, although the rise
of libertarianism on the contemporary Right may amount to a move in that direction.
21. E.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 115 (2008).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 54-55, 92 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV.
L. REv. 1077, 1080-81 (2014).
23. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and
Political Culture in the American Federal System 6 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(available on SSRN at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2552866
[https://perma.cc/R6RY-3Y9M]).
24. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Under Trump, Red States Are Slashing the Safety Net and Blue
States Are Fighting Back, THE NATION (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/under-
trump-red-states-are-slashing-the-safety-net-and-blue-states-are-fighting-back/
[https://perma.cc/P9WE-MZDJ] ("Is America turning into two different republics sharing one set
of borders?").
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measures. 2 5 What that means, in part, is that the contemporary Congress is
marked by high levels of partisan sorting: Members are more easily sorted
by party today than they were in the past.26 There are fewer conservative
Democrats and fewer liberal Republicans.2 7 As a result, there is little or no
overlap between members of the different parties.2 8 Second, and closely
related, is the notion of ideological divergence, which refers to the distance
between the party medians. 29 That distance today is greater than at any time
since the end of Reconstruction.3 0
A vigorous debate exists as to whether this polarization of politicians
reflects a broader polarization of the public at large. One group views the
public as basically moderate in its views but sees a fundamental disconnect
between those views and a highly polarized political class.3' Another group
holds that polarization reaches much further down into the electorate.32 But
even if the public's policy views remain moderate, surveys reveal high
degrees of "affective" polarization.33 Simply put, Democrats and
Republicans don't like each other very much-much less, it seems, than in
25. See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American
Politics, 46 POLITY 411, 411-13 (2014) (concluding, based on roll-call votes, that "[p]olarization
of the Democratic and Republican Parties is higher than at any time since the end of the Civil War").
26. Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115
COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1694 (2015).
27. Hare & Poole, supra note 25, at 416 fig.1 (showing ideological dispersion of the parties in
Congress 1879-2013).
28. Farina, supra note 26, at 1694. According to the National Journal's ideological rankings of
members of Congress, for example, the number of Representatives located between the most liberal
Republican and the most conservative Democrat in the House dropped from 344 in 1982 to four in
2013. Chris Cillizza, The Ideological Middle Is Dead in Congress. Really Dead., WASH. POST (Apr.
10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/the-ideological-middle-
is-dead-in-congress-really-dead/?utm-term=.bf4a268983ff [https://perma.cc/ZLM2-YCY4]. In the
Senate, there were fifty-eight senators in this overlap-space in 1982; by 2013, none. Id.
29. Farina, supra note 26, at 1694.
30. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.COM (Mar. 21, 2015),
https://legacy.voteview.com/politicalpolarization_2014.htm [https://perma.cc/BM8C-9NZK]; see
David W. Brady & Hahrie Han, An Extended Historical View of Congressional Party Polarization
(Dec. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
31. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?
THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 7-8 (3d ed. 2011).
32. See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS,
POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83 (2010); Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders,
Is Polarization a Myth?, 70 J. POL. 542, 553-54 (2008) ("The high level of ideological polarization
evident among political elites in the United States reflects real divisions within the American
electorate.").
33. See HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 28-33; Political Polarization in the
American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/201 4 /06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [https://perma.cc/S495-LEB9]
(reporting that, in 2014, 27% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans saw the other party as "a threat
to the well-being of the country").
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the 1980s and 1990s.34 And this partisan dislike has translated into a
polarization of political trust, so that partisans report radically low levels of
trust in government when the other party dominates the national
government.3 5
Such polarization translates into sharp and sustained disagreement and
a refusal to compromise across party lines. Evidence suggests that this effect
is most severe when institutions are closely divided, as either party can
realistically hope to gain control and neither can afford to give the other a
victory.36 When different parties control the House and Senate, the probable
effect is gridlock-an inability to get things done because there's no common
ground for consensus.37 The same is often true when one party controls both
houses of Congress and the other party controls the White House. Unless the
dominant party in Congress has a veto-proof majority, the President can
block major legislation.
These obstacles can sometimes be overcome by appeals to the public at
large. But low levels of political trust make it difficult for a president to go
over the heads of partisan opponents in the Congress and appeal to moderates
in the other party, as President Reagan was able to do in the 1980s.38 The
consequences are well known: gridlock means that Congress is likely to
produce less federal legislation, and the bills that do emerge are likely to be
less consequential." Rather than addressing big, contentious questions, a
gridlocked Congress will tend to enact symbolic legislation or to leave the
critical choices to agencies.4 0
Things look different under unified government, of course. When the
same party controls both houses of Congress and the Presidency, it can-in
theory at least-accomplish quite a lot.4 1 In times of unified government, the
34. See HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 30-31 (discussing increases in
Democratic and Republican negativity towards the other party over time). Your humble authors
remain a happy exception.
35. See id. at 73-91, 94.
36. See id. at 25; FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND
PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 18-21 (2009) (explaining that political parties' institutional
interest in "winning elections and wielding power" can bring them into conflict, even when they are
not ideologically opposed on an issue).
37. See McCarty, supra note 18 ("The combination of high ideological stakes and intense
competition for party control of the national government has all but eliminated the incentives for
significant bipartisan cooperation on important national problems. Consequently, polarization has
reduced congressional capacity to govern.").
38. See HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 40-42.
39. On the subject of gridlock, see generally, Symposium, The American Congress: The Legal
Implications of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013).
40. See, e.g., Diana Epstein & John D. Graham, Polarized Politics and Policy Consequences
(RAND Corp., Occasional Paper 2007), at 17, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/occasional-papers/2007/RANDOP197.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PQR-X4M2].
41. There are important caveats here. The legislative process builds in enough veto-gates and
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consequence of polarization should be more extreme legislation.42 In that
sense, polarization raises the stakes of control of the national government: if
one party can win control of both Congress and the Presidency, it can dictate
policy on virtually every issue people might care about and need not
compromise with the minority party.
It is not obvious that the polarization we have described is a bad thing.
After all, as we have already noted, American political scientists at the middle
of the twentieth century longed for ideologically pure parties that would offer
voters a clear choice; this, they thought, was the key to truly responsible
government.43 To assess whether political polarization is good or bad for the
Republic would require its own article (or book), and we cannot offer a
rigorous analysis here. Briefly, we would emphasize several specific
concerns developed elsewhere in the literature. Some political scientists
argue that unified government can produce legislation that is more extreme
than many of the majority party's own constituents would want-and thus
inconsistent with the preferences of the majority of voters." Moreover, our
separation of powers effectively imposes supermajority requirements on
most legislative action; as a result, polarization combined with a close
division of the electorate results either in gridlock or diversion of government
action into constitutionally dubious channels.45 Finally, recent literature
suggests that contemporary polarization is more "affective" than policy-
driven; in other words, Americans have developed a strong dislike for
persons on the other political "team" even though the actual policy
effective supermajority requirements that the minority party can often still gum things up even under
conditions of unified government. Moreover, unified government can sometimes expose fissures in
the majority party, producing something reminiscent of gridlock under divided government. See,
e.g., Louis Jacobson, The Year of Single Party Control and Supermajorities, GOVERNING (Jan. 7,
2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-year-single-party-control-supermajorities
.html [https://perma.cc/7V85-BNDG] (discussing examples from state government). The first year
of the Trump administration seemed to bear out that hypothesis, as the Republicans failed to move
major legislation (including the much-promised repeal of the Affordable Care Act) through
Congress. By the end of the year, however, the gigantic tax overhaul had changed the picture
substantially. See, e.g., Naomi Jagoda, Trump Signs Tax Bill Into Law, THE HILL (Dec. 22, 2017),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/366148-trump-signs-tax-bill-into-law
[https://perma.cc/H6GZ-8FTT].
42. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, America's Missing Moderates: Hiding in Plain Sight, AM. INT.,
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/02/12/americas-missing-moderates-hiding-in-plain-
sight/ [https://perma.cc/99ZH-YRFL] (discussing excesses by both parties during recent periods of
unified government).
43. See supra note 19.
44. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 148, 164 (2011) (finding that states "tend to 'overshoot' relative to the median voter's
specific policy preferences").
45. See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann, Foreword to AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES,
CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION, at xxii-xxiii (James A. Thurber &
Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015).
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differences between the parties are often minor.46 It is hard to see any upside
to polarization once it reaches that point. In any event, we sketch these
reasons simply to give a sense of our priors. Our argument here must largely
presuppose, rather than defend, the proposition that polarization is worrisome
and in need of mitigation. Our question is whether federalism-and, in
particular, state litigation-is likely to mitigate or exacerbate the polarization
that worries us.
B. Polarization and the States
Federalism can operate as an important safety valve in polarized times,
lowering the temperature on contentious national policy debates and creating
opportunities for policymaking that may be impossible at the national level.47
In evaluating this claim, it will help to distinguish between polarization
within states and polarization among states. Some states, at least, seem to
have less polarized politics than we see at the national level. In these states,
bipartisan resolutions to divisive issues may well be possible. But even if
states have similar political cultures to that at the national level, the
distribution of political preferences is geographically uneven. This
polarization among states-the now familiar divide between red and blue
states-makes it possible to act on divisive issues in ways that avoid the all-
or-nothing nature of national solutions.
1. Polarization Within States.-The patterns of polarization that define
national politics today are not replicated in all of the states. In Massachusetts,
for example, Democrats and Republicans can agree on a generous level of
social provision and broadly libertarian social policies,48 while Texas
Republicans and Democrats tend to share a general commitment to a low-
tax, small-government model.49
Precisely why this is so is difficult to pin down, but the available
evidence suggests two (complementary) answers. First, state politicians may
themselves be less polarized-in the sense of ideological distance-than
46. See, e.g., HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 28-33; LILLIANA MASON,
UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: How POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 50-54 (2018) ("[C]urrent levels of
partisan antipathy have moved beyond pure disagreements of principle. Partisans dislike each other
to a degree that cannot be explained by policy disagreement alone.").
47. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REv. 575, 589 (2018)
("Federalism is the classic constitutional solution to reduce the costs of political contestation
through policy decentralization.").
48. See Susan Milligan, The Popular Republicans, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-02-02/republican-governors-stay-above-
the-fray-in-blue-states [https://perma.cc/BR2T-KWGX] (discussing Massachusetts Governor
Charlie Baker).
49. See, e.g., ERICA GREIDER, BIG, HOT, CHEAP, AND RIGHT: WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN
FROM THE STRANGE GENIUS OF TExAS 32 (2013).
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their federal counterparts. Second, even if Democrats and Republicans are
miles apart ideologically, the unique features of state government may
dampen the effects of that distance.
To begin with, it appears that party identity varies across states: it means
something different to be a Republican in Massachusetts than it does to be a
Republican in Texas. In other words, partisan sorting is not as clear-cut at the
state level as it is in Washington, D.C. Whereas there is vanishingly little
overlap between the national representatives of the two parties, the picture
looks different if one focuses on state legislators. Democrats elected to state
office in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas, for example, are in some
cases more conservative than Republicans in Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Hawaii, Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts.o
Ideological divergence is also muted-or at least more mixed-at the
state level. A leading 2011 study of polarization in state legislatures found
that the distance between party medians varied significantly from one state
to the next." California boasted the most polarized state legislature, leading
a group of fifteen states in which ideological divergence was more
pronounced than in Congress. The majority of state legislatures, however,
were less polarized than Congress. 52 Similarly, five of the last six governors
of Massachusetts-one of the bluest states there is-have been
Republicans." Last year, the current governor of the Bay State enjoyed the
highest approval ratings in the nation, and several other Republican
governors in blue states are similarly popular.5 4 One recent analyst concluded
that "Republican gubernatorial candidates are ... able to be more moderate
50. Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of State Legislatures, 105 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 530, 540 fig.7 (2011).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 546 fig.15.
53. See Chris Cillizza, The Most Popular Governor in the Country Is a Republican from
Massachusetts. Yes, Really., CNN (July 22, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/22/politics/
charlie-baker-q-and-a/index.html [https://perma.cc/3VL8-XLW2]; Former Governors' Bios,
NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N,
https://classic.nga.org/cms/FormerGovBios?inOffice=Any&state%20=ed0deacd-6db-4311-9e7a-
9f9bc737e513&party-&lastName=&firstName=&nbrterms=Any&biography-&sex=Any&religio
n=&race=Any&college=&higherOfficesServed=&militaryService=&warsServed=&honors=&birt
hState=Any&submit-Search [https://perma.cc/WGB4-EUKN] (listing the party affiliations of
Massachusetts's current and prior governors).
54. See Cillizza, supra note 53 (reporting a 71% approval rating for Massachusetts Governor
Charlie Baker); David Mark, Republican Governors Thrive in Blue States, Polling Shows,
MORNING CONSULT (July 18, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/2017/07/18/republican-
governors-thrive-blue-states-polling-shows/ [https://perma.cc/86QG-T4QL] (stating that
Governors Charlie Baker of Massachusetts, Larry Hogan of Maryland, and Phil Scott of Vermont
all had "enviable approval ratings" before their re-elections); Milligan, supra note 48 (reporting that
"Nevada's Brian Sandoval, Maryland's Larry Hogan, Massachusetts's Charlie Baker, and
Vermont's Phil Scott"-all Republicans in blue states-"remain among the most popular governors
in the country").
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than Republican presidential candidates, and therefore tend to be more
ideologically compatible with the Democrat-dominated electorates of blue
states." 5 Republican governors in Democratic states thus seem to do best
when they take a moderate line on social issues and maintain significant
separation from the national party. 6
As this last point suggests, an inquiry into polarization in state
government should heed, not only the ideological preferences of state
officials, but also how those preferences translate into political behavior.
Several characteristics of state government suggest that we might expect state
politics to reflect less partisan conflict even if state officials are themselves
fairly polarized." For example, surveys indicate that state and local
governments enjoy considerably higher levels of trust than the federal
government. Researchers have been asking survey questions about trust in
government for many decades, and trust has recently become central to some
scholars of polarization." Those scholars have generally focused on national-
level measures of trust. But the survey questions have often included a
comparative component that inquires whether citizens repose more trust in
state or national institutions. This research concludes that "[c]itizens on
average evaluate the performance of the federal government as significantly
lower than that of the state and local governments, report less faith in the
federal government to 'do the right thing,' have significantly lower
confidence in the ability of the federal government to solve problems
effectively, see the federal government as significantly less responsive than
lower levels of government, and nearly 60% see the federal government as
the most corrupt level of government."59 If polarization scholars are right that
55. Kevin Deutsch, Why Blue States Elect Red Governors, 21 WASH. U. POL. REV., Nov. 11,
.2014, http://www.wupr.org/2014/11/11/why-blue-states-elect-red-governors/ [https://perma.cc
/3ZRP-N3WT].
56. See Cillizza, supra note 53; Joshua Miller, Why Is Charlie Baker So Popular?, Bos. GLOBE
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/09/27/why-charlie-baker-popular
/0DjpSUgTJPbQZWZ80qdOPL/story.html [https://perma.cc/Z54U-VSLB]; Milligan, supra note
48.
57. The discussion here is exploratory; we make no strong claims about causation. There is
widespread debate about what causes polarization generally. See Farina, supra note 26
(summarizing political science literature). We express no view on those broader questions.
58. See HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 33-39.
59. See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An
Experimental Test, 4 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 589, 598 (2007) (reporting results from the 2000 Attitudes
Toward Government Study, but concluding that "[t]hese findings are consistent with those reported
by other scholars, using other nationally representative surveys"); see also State Governments
Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-rating-
hits-new-low/ [https://perma.cc/8U2M-WATG]. The Pew Research Center explains that:
Overall, 63% say they have a favorable opinion of their local government, virtually
unchanged over recent years. And 57% express a favorable view of their state
government - a five-point uptick from last year. By contrast, just 28% rate the federal
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higher levels of trust make it more likely that partisans will make "ideological
sacrifices" to create bipartisan solutions,"o then that ought to be more likely
at the state level.
Culture may also play a role in mitigating ideological polarization's
effects on state officials. State political cultures may be sufficiently
distinctive that the range of partisan disagreement is narrower within them.61
Daniel Elazar, for example, argued that certain states share a broader
commitment to regulation and social provision based on having been
originally settled by New England Puritans committed to those values.62
Consistent with this view, Republican governors in New England have
tended to support the more generous social welfare arrangements in those
states while pushing fiscal conservatism around the edges. 63 We might further
speculate that state political cultures include shared norms of political
practice that inhibit the nastier forms of partisanship that entrench
polarization.'
Or perhaps state and local governments deal with a large number of
bread-and-butter issues-e.g., road maintenance, education, and crime
control--on which the public may have limited tolerance for partisan
government in Washington favorably. That is down five points from a year ago and
the lowest percentage ever in a Pew Research Center survey.
Id. Interestingly, levels of trust in the federal government themselves vary significantly from state
to state. See Paul Brace & Martin Johnson, Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? Examining the
Correlates ofState-Level Confidence in the Federal Government, in PUBLIC OPINION IN STATE
POLITICS 19 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., 2006).
60. HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 157-61.
61. See, e.g., Samuel C. Patterson, The Political Cultures of the American States, 30 J. POL.
187, 195-96 (1968). Patterson argues that:
No one would expect the American political culture to be uniformly distributed
spatially; our evidence is adequate enough to show that the political culture of
Mississippi is not the same as that of Iowa. Some states may stand out more
distinctively than others, and some group themselves in sections or regions that are
distinctive.
Id. See also JOHN J. HARRIGAN & DAVID C. NICE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND
COMMUNITIES 10 (10th ed. 2008) (observing that "numerous studies have found that political
culture influences the kind of policies adopted by states").
62. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC: THE IMPACT OF SPACE, TIME, AND
CULTURE ON AMERICAN POLITICS 58 (1994); see also DAvID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED:
FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 189-90, 200-01 (1989) (examining in depth the influence
of Puritan folkways in New England).
63. See Cillizza, supra note 53 (observing that Massachusetts governor Charlie Baker ran "as
basically a non-partisan manager" who would "watch the state's pocketbook," but that he favored
"abortion rights and featured his brother's coming-out story in a legendary campaign ad"); Milligan,
supra note 48 (citing social welfare policies of New England Republican governors, such as
expanding Medicaid).
64. On political norms and conventions generally, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel, Sustaining
Collective Self-Governance and Collective Action: A Constitutional Role Morality for the Trump
Era and Beyond, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
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posturing that prevents basic needs from being met. 65 We come from North
Carolina-deep purple and closely divided. We just had a particularly nasty
gubernatorial election and a fractious legislative session. But even in states
like ours, pragmatic concerns like fixing potholes and reducing crime may
moderate polarization's effects. Unlike their federal counterparts, state
politicians can't spend all their time grandstanding; state governments have
to get certain things done, and a lot of those things aren't particularly
ideological. Balanced budget requirements may further constrain them from
the worst kinds of obstruction and kicking the can down the road. Successful
Republican blue-state governors, after all, are frequently characterized as
"pragmatic," "non-ideological" managers who tend to decouple their own
political fortunes from the national party.6 6 Democratic governors in red
states are, for now at least, fewer and further between. But the ones we have
seem to have pursued a similar approach. 7
Another important factor may be that (unlike North Carolina) many
states are not as closely divided as the national government-they are not
purple but consistently red or blue. As we've already noted, some research
suggests that close divisions increase the incentives for political opportunism,
as the minority party may hope to regain the majority if it can prevent the
opposition from being successful.68 In states where the minority is likely to
remain in that position, by contrast, minority party-members may seek to
have at least some voice through bipartisan cooperation. We might even be
seeing some vindication of the Antifederalist notion that republican
government-predicated on statesmanlike transcendence of narrow factional
interest-is more likely to succeed in smaller communities. It's hard to know
for sure, and the question is ultimately an empirical one on which we
presently lack much good evidence. We do have evidence, however, that
polarization and its effects are less extreme at the state level.
One significant caveat is in order. A variety of research suggests that
levels of polarization and mistrust are in part a function of the issue set that
is salient to voters.69 The comparatively sunny cast of some states' politics
65. See Deutsch, supra note 55 (noting that "state and national politics are two different
animals, with different issues at play").
66. See, e.g., Milligan, supra note 48 (discussing four Republican governors working with
Democratic-controlled legislatures); see also Cillizza, supra note 53 (describing the popularity of
Massachusetts governor Charlie Baker).
67. See, e.g., Tyler Bridges, Can This Governor Teach Democrats How to Win in the South?,
POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 2 017/09/02/john-bel-edwards-
southern-democrats-215570 [https://perna.cc/4UQ2-UV8M] (profiling Louisiana governor John
Bel Edwards).
68. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 19, at 44, 97-98 (hypothesizing that
salience affects the influence that trust exerts on political opinions and giving examples); HOPKINS,
supra note 19, at 99-100 ("[T]he newfound salience of social and cultural concerns during the 1990s
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may thus arise from the issues laid before state governments. If we were to
devolve certain contentious issues from the national scene to state
governments, that might well change the character of state politics. Perhaps
habits of cooperation forged in filling potholes might bleed over into debates
about transgender rights. But they also might not.
In sum, there are reasons to think that federalism can mitigate the effects
of political polarization by offering alternative policymaking venues in which
the hope of consensus politics is more plausible. As the next section details,
taking divisive questions off the national agenda may moderate the overall
polarization problem even if that is not true.
2. Polarization Among States.-The notion of an equally divided nation
goes back all the way to the 2000 election.70 But very few places in America
are fifty-fifty in this way: "Geography matters."7 1 Within the states, relatively
small differences in the correlation of partisan forces7 2 significantly affect
political outcomes, painting some state governments completely red and
others blue.7 3 In those states, even if state-level bipartisanship fails to
generate effective policy on divisive issues, unified government might step
in to fill the breach.
As of 2015, only nineteen states had divided government.7 4 That number
declined to eighteen after the 2016 elections, then slipped to seventeen after
West Virginia Governor Jim Justice switched to the Republican party.75
Thus, even those state legislatures with relatively high levels of polarization
may be capable of avoiding gridlock and getting things done. In New Jersey,
for example, Democrat Phil Murphy's election as governor has made the
Garden State one of eight states under unified Democratic control. "If
Murphy has his way," the Washington Post predicted, "New Jersey will
become a proving ground for every liberal policy idea coming into fashion,
from legalized marijuana to a $15 minimum wage, from a 'millionaire's tax'
to a virtual bill of rights for undocumented immigrants."7 6 Meanwhile,
was the driving force behind the divergence of the blue Northeast and Pacific Coast from the red
South and interior West.").
70. See, e.g., Michael Barone, The 49 Percent Nation, 33 NAT'L J. 1710, 1710-12 (June 9,
2001), http://www.uvm.edu/-dguber/POLS125/articles/barone.htm [https://perma.cc/E2P2-
DEZA] (emphasizing the narrow popular vote margins in recent elections).
71. Id. (formatting omitted).
72. Matthew S. Levendusky & Jeremy C. Pope, Red States vs. Blue States: Going Beyond the
Mean, 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 227, 242-44 (2011).
73. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 41-45 (giving examples).
74. State Partisan Composition, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 11, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q8D9-WVBC].
75. Id.
76. David Weigel, Incoming NJ Governor Plans a Swing to the Left-And a Model for the
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Republican-controlled states have "pursued economic and fiscal strategies
built around lower taxes, deeper spending cuts and less regulation" and have
adopted policies with respect to labor, education, and social issues that
diverge sharply from blue-state strategies.
To be sure, the combination of polarization and unified government can
produce less compromise and more extreme policy in state governments,
too.78 But the stakes are lower for statewide, as compared to nationwide,
solutions. At the very least, devolving decision-making authority to the states
opens up opportunities for policy variation-not only among states, but also
between the states and Congress. A flourishing federal system means that
Democrats currently out of power in Washington, D.C. don't just have to
give up or focus on rearguard actions at the federal level; they can govern at
the state level.79 Especially when state government is unified, those
Democrats can pursue a very different set of policies than those originating
on Capitol Hill. The consequence may not be compromise, exactly, but it
does offer a way to serve the preferences of people who identify with the
minority party in Congress.so
A federalism-based modus vivendi is unlikely to satisfy devoted
partisans on one side or another of any divisive issue. But as Michael
McConnell has explained, "So long as preferences for government policies
are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be
satisfied by decentralized decision making than by a single national
authority.""1 Moreover, when different jurisdictions can implement (and not
Country, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/incoming-nj-
governor-plans-a-swing-to-the-left--and-a-model-for-the-country/ 2 018/01/13/25f06238-f7d7-
11e7-a9e3-abl8ce41436astory.html?noredirect-on&utm term-.fa458987b2c4 [bttps://perma.cc
/MF3B-KKTJ].
77. Dan Balz, Red, Blue States Move in Opposite Directions in a New Era of Single-Party
Control, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/red-blue-states-
move-in-opposite-directions-in-a-new-era-of-single-party-control/2013/12/28/9583d922-673a-
11e3-ae56-22de072l4Oa2_story.htmil?noredirect-on&utm term-. 19b8da2155al
[https://perma.cc/B3X3-TA9F].
78. See id. ("The risk is that with unified ontrol, governors and their like-minded legislators
push beyond the views of their citizenry, particularly in states where public opinion is more evenly
divided."); Lax & Phillips, supra note 44, at 149 (studying congruence between state policy and
public opinion and finding that "state policy is far more polarized than public preferences")
(formatting omitted). As we noted above, some research suggests -omewhat counterintuitively-
that extreme policy may be more likely in states like North Carolina, where the two parties are in
pitched battle for control of state government, than in states in which the majority party can count
on continuing supremacy. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1755, 1783-
86 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in. the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277, 1301-05, 1311 (2004).
80. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 22 (suggesting that state challenges to federal law stem
largely from partisanship).
81. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv.
1484, 1493 (1987).
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simply advocate) their preferences, they can have significant and unexpected
effects on the national debate. When the same-sex marriage issue became
salient in the mid-1 990s, for example, most states used the autonomy that the
federal system afforded them to explicitly outlaw the practice. But some
states permitted same-sex marriages to go forward, and over time the
example of those new families helped bring about one of the most remarkable
shifts in public opinion in American history.82 State-by-state diversity may
thus break up rigidly polarized political patterns over time, even if state
political cultures are not significantly more warm and fuzzy than the national
one.
C. How Federal Polarization Affects Federalism-And How State
Litigation Can Help
We've argued that states can serve as safety valves for polarized
national politics. In order for states to play those roles, however, the federal
government must leave them room to maneuver. And there's the rub: while
polarization highlights the benefits of federalism, it also poses a distinct
threat to state autonomy.
This point is most obvious under conditions of unified national
government. As we explained above, polarization plus unified government is
likely to produce more extreme policy. That means more federal
overreaching-statutes that trench on state interests or that are more broadly
preemptive in scope. Where that is true, states may find they have less space
to act, and the benefits outlined above will be lost.
Divided government at the federal level can also hold threats to state
autonomy, though the reason is less intuitive. At first blush, polarization plus
divided government may seem like a boon for federalism: the less Congress
is able to do, the more that's left for the states." But congressional gridlock
may also produce more unilateral action by the federal Executive, in the form
of executive orders and guidance, gentle and not-so-gentle nudges directed
at agencies, and so on. This dynamic was reflected in President Obama's "We
Can't Wait" campaign, for example. The campaign started with a speech in
which the President said, "[W]e can't wait for an increasingly dysfunctional
Congress to do its job. Where they won't act, I will."8 4 And it became a
82. See generally Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons
from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REv. 1133, 1135-36, 1140-42 (2014).
83. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 17, 68-69 (2013) (describing the "Legal Process" model of federalism, under which
"[w]hat is 'reserved' to the States ... is regulatory authority over matters upon which Congress has
been unwilling or unable to legislate"); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 525-35 (1954) (developing this view).
84. See Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, "We Can't Wait ": Barack Obama, Partisan
Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 3 (2014).
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yearlong theme in the lead-up to the 2012 election cycle. In one year alone,
the President announced more than forty executive actions packaged under
the "We Can't Wait" brand." President Trump has shown few signs of
retreating from executive-branch unilateralism, notwithstanding unified
Republican control of government; he has used executive orders for (among
other things) his controversial travel bans and efforts to strip "sanctuary
cities" of federal funding.86
From a federalism perspective, there's a lot not to like about unilateral
executive action. Most obviously, it's easier to do than running formal
legislation through two chambers of Congress and the President. Many
people believe that state interests are protected in the national political
process through the close ties between national and state parties and
politicians and the representation of states through their congressional
delegations.8 1 Others emphasize the many "veto-gates" in Congress that
stand in the way of legislation.8  These are the so-called political and
procedural safeguards of federalism. And to the extent that states get
85. Id. at 9. One of the tools Obama used was the conditional waiver-allowing states to avoid
requirements of federal law, such as No Child Left Behind, only if they adopted new standards
prescribed by the Obama Administration. Id. at 11-12.
86. Rebecca Harrington, Trump Signed 90 Executive Actions in His First 100 Days-Here's
What Each One Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 3, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
executive-orders-memorandum-proclamations-presidential-action-guide-
2 017-1
[https://perma.cc/9TTV-UV49]. The one major exception is President Trump's effort to replace the
Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) immigration program,
implemented through unilateral executive action, with a legislated immigration package. See
generally Noah Rothman, Congress Doesn't Want the Responsibility Anymore, COMMENTARY
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/congress-outsourcng-
apathy-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/8FMX-UTTR] (surveying executive action under the Trump
administration and suggesting the cause is as much congressional abdication as executive
overreach). Of course, if no legislation is forthcoming, Trump may likewise reach for his pen and
phone.
87. On the political safeguards theory, see, for example, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 175-84 (1980) (arguing that the states' political representation obviates the need
for judicial review in federalism cases); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards ofFederalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 233-34 (2000) (arguing that political parties
protect states by linking the fortunes of national- and state-level politicians); Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards ofFederalism: The Role ofthe States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-46 (1954) (arguing that the states'
representation in Congress provides a powerful check on national action); Ernest A. Young, Two
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1349, 1350-52 (2001) (arguing that political
safeguards are not sufficient to replace judicial review but nonetheless provide an important check
on national action).
88. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation ofPowers as a Safeguard ofFederalism, 79 TEXAS
L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2001) ("[T]he lawmaking procedures prescribed by the
Constitution safeguard federalism in an important respect simply by requiring the participation and
assent of multiple actors. These procedures make federal law more difficult to adopt by creating a
series of 'veto gates."'); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 87, at 1361-63 (stressing the role of
legislative inertia in protecting federalism).
632018]
Texas Law Review
protection in the legislative process, one might worry about federal policy
being made in a far more streamlined fashion and centered in the executive
branch, where states have no special voice.89 Granted, states may find
considerable freedom to shape federal policy in its bureaucratic interstices by
proposing innovative ways to implement federal mandates or by dragging
their feet on locally unpopular requirements.9 0 But despite the practical
importance of implementation authority, the leeway afforded is unlikely to
be broad enough to accommodate the basic ideological conflicts that often
characterize our polarized national debates.
This brings us to an additional way in which states can mitigate the
effects of polarization-not through legislation and regulation, but through
litigation: states can challenge federal action that arguably goes too far.91
Anthony Johnstone has observed that "[i]f the primary virtue of federalism
in these politically polarized times is the accommodation of diverse policy
preferences ... then attorneys general are uniquely qualified to give voice to
those preferences in federalism litigation."92 This role is not unique to states,
of course-private litigants can bring federalism-based legal challenges as
well.9 3 As we explain below, however, considerations of expertise,
institutional capacity, and democratic accountability suggest that states may
be particularly well-situated to spearhead such litigation. Indeed, states have
been at the forefront of some of the most consequential challenges to federal
policy in recent years, including not only the constitutional challenge to the
ACA but also more recent challenges to the Trump Administration's travel
bans.
Those examples are merely the tip of the state-litigation iceberg, but
they capture a feature that has drawn significant attention in popular
commentary: the states' challenges to the ACA and the travel bans have been
decidedly partisan affairs. The ACA litigation was led by red states; the
ongoing travel-ban litigation is dominated by blue states.9 4 One might well
wonder, therefore, whether in practice state litigation mitigates polarization
or instead exacerbates it. The remainder of this Article is devoted to that
question. We begin by surveying the landscape of state litigation, mapping
89. See Clark, supra note 88, at 1393-94; Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. REV. 869, 869-71, 900 (2008).
90. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1271-80 (2009) (describing this phenomenon as "uncooperative federalism").
91. See, e.g., Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political Safeguard of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1023, 1025-26 (2017) (contending that the state litigation is an undervalued safeguard for
federalism).
92. Johnstone, supra note 47, at 599.
93. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223-24 (2011) (rejecting the United States'
contention that individuals lack standing to raise claims that a federal statute exceeds Congress's
enumerated powers).
94. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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the many different ways that state AGs can shape national policy, and
describing some of the institutional and doctrinal changes that have caused
such litigation to flourish. We then examine how the various categories of
state litigation relate to polarization at both the federal and state levels.
II. The Flowering of State Public-Law Litigation
In recent decades, state AGs have emerged as a uniquely powerful cadre
of lawyers. As the chief legal officers for their respective states, AGs are
responsible for enforcing state law and defending the state against legal
challenges; in many areas, they also share responsibility with federal
agencies for enforcing federal law." Independently elected in forty-three
states, AGs stand at the top of organizational hierarchies that operate
alongside-and sometimes in opposition to-other institutions for state
policymaking.96
Although state public litigation goes back considerably further, state
AGs' work first grabbed the national spotlight in the 1990s, when AGs from
different states banded together to take on Big Tobacco. Although AGs were
by no means the first lawyers to sue the tobacco companies, they succeeded
where others had failed, securing a settlement that required substantial
changes in tobacco marketing and payments to the states totaling more than
95. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 45, 84, 121-22, 234, 270-73 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter NAAG] (discussing the role of state AGs and areas of joint federal-state enforcement,
such as antitrust and environmental law).
96. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006). Interesting questions arise
when a given state itself has divided government. In North Carolina, for example, the Republican-
dominated legislature has jousted with the Democratic governor for control over litigation on behalf
of the state. See Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017, § 147-17, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws
248, 261-66 (amending various provisions so as to strengthen the General Assembly's control over
litigation involving the constitutionality of state statutes). Those sorts of problems are not without
analogs at the federal level, as when the Republican-controlled House of Representatives sought to
defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act after the Obama Administration announced that it was
unwilling to do so. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 753-54 (2013) (discussing the role
of the House's Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group). But because most states lack a unitary executive,
it is also not uncommon for the state governor and attorney general to be from different parties. See,
e.g., Wikipedia, Government of Massachusetts, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government
_of Massachusetts [https://perma.cc/NH8A-VQ2J] (listing Massachusetts's governor as a
Republican and its AG as a Democrat); Wikipedia, Government of Illinois,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government ofIllinois [https://perma.cc/K9SS-48CA] (stating that
Illinois currently has a Republican governor and a Democratic AG). This creates thorny state
separation of powers problems on which federal practice can provide little guidance. Cf THE
FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472-80 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against
a plural executive). We do not explore those problems further here, other than to suggest that a non-
unitary executive may make it easier for voters to weigh in on the litigation decisions of a state
government, simply because those decisions are not folded into a simple up-or-down vote on the
performance of the entire executive branch.
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$206 billion." In more recent years, AGs have targeted, and ultimately
disrupted, settled industry practices by paint producers, toy manufacturers,
pharmaceutical companies, and auto companies-among others. As one
corporate lobbyist put it, "In some ways, [AGs are] more powerful than
governors .... They don't need a legislature to approve what they do. Their
legislature is a jury. That's what makes them frightening[.]"9 8
State litigation is not just practically significant; it is also politically
salient. And as AGs have become increasingly active and entrepreneurial,
they have also attracted criticism from various quarters-including from
other AGs."9 Critics claim that state litigation is driven by partisan ambitions
rather than a desire to vindicate the interests of the states qua states. We take
up those critiques in Part III. Our goal here is to provide a positive account
of what state public-law litigation is, and what makes it possible.
Before proceeding, a few words on terminology and scope: we use the
term "state public-law litigation" because we want to address a particular
subset of litigation by state AGs. We do not focus on government-contracts
litigation involving the state, ordinary civil enforcement of state regulatory
laws, or most individual criminal prosecutions. Rather, our subject is more
like the category of impact litigation undertaken by public-interest lawyers.
Just as public-rights cases brought by nongovernmental organizations
seeking broad reforms became a critical category of litigation in the late
twentieth century, requiring courts and scholars to rethink a litigation model
predicated on the enforcement of private rights, 00 so too litigation by state
governments has increasingly taken on a public-law cast.
That said, the category remains fuzzy. Although one can easily identify
examples of state public-law litigation, such as the state lawsuits challenging
the ACA or the Trump travel bans, delimiting principles are harder to come
by.10' Because our interest is in the practical impact of state litigation on
American politics and the federal system, we want to define the relevant
category fairly loosely. What we have in mind is (1) litigation activity (not
only filing lawsuits but also defending them and participating as amici) (2) by
97. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
98. Alan Greenblatt, The Avengers General, GOVERNING (2003), https://www.heartland.org
Ltemplate-assets/documents/publications/12520.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QNP-GDVE].
99. See id. (describing Republican AGs' critiques of entrepreneurial state litigation and the
ensuing formation of the Republican Association of Attorneys General).
100. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73-76
(7th ed. 2015) (describing the shift from a private "dispute resolution" model to a public rights or
"law declaration" model of the judicial function).
101. Cf Randy E. Barnett, Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 268-72 (1986) (highlighting the difficulty of separating "public" and
"private" law).
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states 10 2 that is (3) intended to have a legal and/or political impact that
transcends the individual case and the jurisdiction where the action takes
place.
A. The Engines ofExpanding State Litigation
Prior to the 1980s, most state AG offices could be described as "[p]lacid
and reactive."1 03 Things changed dramatically over the next few decades. The
"New Federalism" of the Reagan Administration devolved countless
regulatory and administrative responsibilities from the federal government to
the states. 10 4 As the workload of state agencies increased, so too did their
litigation exposure-with the burden of defense falling on state AGs.
Recognizing their AGs' significant new responsibilities, states allocated
more resources to them. 0 s Higher budgets and greater responsibilities, in
turn, drew a new breed of attorney to the AG's office. Increasingly, the
"state's law firm" was staffed with "a younger, better educated, and more
ambitious caliber of attorney."'0 6
As institutional capacity expanded, so too did the opportunities to use it.
When federal agencies decreased their enforcement activities in the 1980s,
state-level enforcers rushed in to fill the void.' Areas like antitrust and
consumer protection, once dominated by the federal government, became
102. We focus here on actions by state AGs. But it bears emphasis that important litigation
efforts have sometimes been led by governors or other state officials, by membership organizations
representing state institutions (such as the National Governors' Association), or by local
governments. The leading challenges to President Trump's effort to punish "sanctuary cities" acting
contrary to federal immigration policy, for example, have been brought by the Cities of San
Francisco and Chicago. Laura Jarrett & Tal Kopan, Federal Judge Again Blocks Trump from
Punishing Sanctuary Cities, CNN (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/15/politics
/chicago-lawsuit-trump-sanctuary-cities-jag-funds/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q2BX-D7TF].
103. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as
National Policymakers, 56 REv. POL. 525, 538 (1994); see Thomas R. Morris, States Before the
U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298, 299 (1987)
(observing that "state attorneys general tended to look upon their role as being merely ministerial
functionaries of the state administration").
104. ERIC N. WALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD, LITIGATING FEDERALISM: THE STATES
BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 45 (1999).
105. During the 1970s and early 1980s, AGs' budgets expanded at rates that "outpaced the
growth of general government spending in every state." Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State
Litigation Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17,
18 (2001). Between 1970 and 1989 the mean number of attorneys increased from 51 to 148, and the
median budget from $612,089 to $9.9 million. WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 104.
106. Clayton, supra note 103; see also Kevin C. Newsom, The State Solicitor General Boom,
32 APP. PRAC. 6, Winter 2013, at 7-8 (describing the rise of appellate attorneys with private
experience in state solicitor general offices).
107. See William L. Webster, The Emerging Role of State Attorneys General and the New
Federalism, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 5 (1990) ("In short order the states asserted themselves in
dramatic fashion.... Attorneys general were called 'fifty regulatory Rambos' by one individual.").
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enclaves of aggressive state enforcement.'o Many AGs established
specialized units and task forces to handle their new responsibilities, thereby
"enhanc[ing] the role of the attorney general as a 'public interest lawyer' and
offer[ing] many opportunities to improve the quality of life for citizens of the
states and jurisdictions."l 09
Meanwhile, new provisions of federal law facilitated state litigation by
authorizing state AGs to enforce federal statutes, often by suing as parens
patriae to protect the rights of state citizens.110 The common law doctrine of
parens patriae dates back to early English practice, in which the King
exercised certain royal prerogatives as "parent of the country.""' In its more
modern form, the doctrine allows states to vindicate sovereign or quasi-
sovereign interests, including an "interest in the health and well-being ... of
[their] residents in general."" 2 Today, many state and federal statutes
explicitly authorize states to sue as parens patriae.113 Others can be read to
authorize state suits implicitly by creating broad rights of action for citizens
whom the states represent." 4 And even absent specific statutory
108. Id.; see also Clayton, supra note 103, at 535-36 (describing states' efforts to secure
regulatory and enforcement authority in areas including antitrust and consumer protection).
109. NAAG, supra note 95, at 46.
110. See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, sec.
301, § 4(c), 90 Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (2012)) (authorizing states to
sue as parens patriae in federal court on behalf of their citizens to secure treble damages for a
variety of federal antitrust violations); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 712 (2011) ("As state attorneys general assumed new prominence,
provisions for state enforcement began to proliferate in Congress. New provisions have been
enacted by virtually every Congress in the last two decades.").
111. Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1859, 1863 (2000); Jack Ratliff,
Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847, 1850 (2000).
112. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
113. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REv. 486, 495-96, 496-97 nn.39-40 (2012). Whether Congress
could confer authority on state AGs to sue in circumstances where state law denies it is an interesting
question, but beyond the scope of this article.
114. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2002))
("[S]tanding provisions in many ... statutes implicitly authorize[] parens patriae standing by using
language that permits any 'person' who is 'aggrieved' or 'injured' to bring suit."); see also
Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 630(a)) (reasoning that AG has statutory standing to sue under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act as "'legal representative' of the people of the [state] for the purposes of this
action"); Minn. v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 568 F. Supp. 556, 563-66 (D. Minn. 1983) (permitting
state to sue as parens patriae under § 210 of Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which permitted
suit by any "person" because "when a state acts in its quasi-sovereign capacity in a parens patriae
action,. .. [a] harm to the individual citizens becomes an injury to the state, and the state in turn
becomes the plaintiff").
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authorization, state AGs may (depending on state law) have common law or
constitutional authority to litigate as parens patriae on behalf of citizens.1"
The 1990s tobacco litigation built on, and spurred, expansions in AG
authority. Prior to the states' assault on Big Tobacco, countless private
plaintiffs had sued under a variety of tort and warranty theories-all seeking
to hold the industry accountable for peddling an unreasonably dangerous
product. None succeeded.116 Many plaintiffs were simply outspent by the
defendants; others were turned away on the ground that they had assumed the
risk of smoking; and still others were thwarted by courts' refusal to permit
large numbers of smokers to sue together as class actions.11 7
Then came the states, which were able to avoid the pitfalls of earlier
litigation and bring the tobacco companies to the bargaining table. Most
states pursued restitution actions, seeking reimbursement for Medicaid
expenses incurred in the treatment of smoking-related illnesses." By
shifting the focus from individual smokers to the states' own losses, the state
suits were able to cut off the tobacco companies' prime defense strategy:
blaming individual smokers. As Mississippi AG Mike Moore put it, "This
time, the industry cannot claim that a smoker knew full well what risks he
took each time he lit up. The state of Mississippi never smoked a cigarette.
Yet it has paid the medical expenses of thousands of indigent smokers who
did."119 Similarly, the states' strategy allowed them to avoid the challenges
of class certification: "[I]nstead of millions of plaintiffs, there would only be
one. Concerns over common issues of fact, which doomed earlier class
actions to fail the predominance and superiority tests of federal and state class
action statutes, would be finessed."120 Ultimately, forty-six states joined the
Master Settlement Agreement, which required the tobacco companies to pay
the states more than $200 billion over twenty-five years and to agree to an
array of regulatory constraints.12 '
115. See generally leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1864-75 (describing the contours
ofparens patriae doctrine and its grounding in common law).
116. Id. at 1860 ("Before the states' litigation, the tobacco industry had not lost a smoking
case .... ).
117. Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation, 57
VAND. L. REv. 2177, 2184-88 (2004) (describing the history of tobacco litigation).
118. Id. at 2189; see also id. (describing Minnesota's consumer-fraud approach as a notable
exception).
119. Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and Protect
Children, 83 A.B.A. J. 53, 53 (1997).
120. Sebok, supra note 117, at 2190.
121. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 371-73 (2000). Four states settled separately for approximately $36.8 billion,
bringing the total to roughly $243 billion. W. Kip Vicusi, The Governmental Composition of the
Insurance Costs ofSmoking, 42 J.L. & ECON. 575, 577 (1999).
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Although the tobacco litigation is in some ways sui generis, it highlights
several features that have helped fuel state litigation more broadly. First, the
tobacco suits entailed an "unprecedented" degree of interstate cooperation
among AGs, and their success made clear-to AGs as well as to potential
defendants-the power of concerted multistate action.122 Second, the
litigation demonstrated the value of cooperation between AGs and private
attorneys. The states' suits benefited from substantial assistance and
financing from private lawyers-a pattern that has been repeated in many
subsequent actions. By teaming up with private counsel (particularly those
willing to work for a contingent fee), state AGs can expand their reach into
litigation that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive or resource-
intensive, or would require specialized expertise.123 Third, the staggering size
of the settlement-"the largest transfer of wealth as a result of litigation in
the history of the human race"' 2 4-revealed just how lucrative state litigation
could be. In the years since the tobacco litigation, state AGs have become
adept at using large monetary recoveries to publicize the financial
contributions they make to the state and its citizens.'2 5 In many states,
moreover, AG offices can retain certain types of financial recoveries, making
litigation a self-sustaining endeavor.12 6
Finally, the states' legal theories in the tobacco cases created a template
for future actions against industries that cause widespread harm to state
citizens.'2 7 The recoupment strategy alone is a powerful tool for recovering
the states' own expenses 28 and becomes more powerful still when combined
with the states' authority to sue as parens patriae to address harms to their
citizens.129 In the ongoing state efforts against opioid manufacturers, for
122. leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1860 ("The scope of interstate attorney general
cooperation was unprecedented.").
123. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 532-
33, 538-46 (2016) (analyzing the costs and benefits of partnerships between public and private
attorneys).
124. Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 564 (2001). Critics are quick
to note that the settlement is being financed largely by smokers, who now pay more for cigarettes.
Id.; see also Sebok, supra note 117, at 2181 ("As an executive at R.J. Reynolds ironically put it,
'[T]here's no doubt that the largest financial stakeholder in the [tobacco] industry is the state
governments."').
125. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REv. 853, 855 & n.6 (2014) (offering examples); Lemos, supra note 110, at 732-33 & n.153 (same).
126. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 125, at 866-67 (describing "revolving fund[]" arrangements
at the state level).
127. See leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1862 (arguing that "it is [the states'] legal
theories, together with the precedent of concerted attorney general action, that have the greatest
implications for joint action on other fronts").
128. See Dagan & White, supra note 121, at 355-57 (focusing on the states' restitutionary
claims and describing similar claims against gun manufacturers and lead-paint makers).
129. See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 1862, 1875-83 (describing parens
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example, the states have asserted various common law tort claims and are
seeking recovery for harms to citizens and to their own proprietary interests,
including "billions of dollars in damages to the State related to the excessive
costs of healthcare, criminal justice, education, social services, lost
productivity; and other economic losses as a direct result of the illicit use of
these dangerous drugs caused by opioid diversion." 3 o
Courts-state and federal-have also played a role in the growth of state
AG litigation. Perhaps most importantly, they have taken an expansive view
of state standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court cited
Massachusetts's "stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests" as a reason
for "special solicitude" in the standing analysis.13 1 Long before those words
were penned, lower federal courts had held that states can sue as parens
patriae to vindicate their citizens' rights under the federal constitution, even
in circumstances in which the citizens themselves would lack standing. For
instance, whereas the rule of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons makes it difficult
for private parties to seek injunctive relief from sporadic instances of official
misconduct, 13 2 courts have permitted states to sue in equivalent cases.13 3
Similarly, as noted above, courts recognized states' standing to sue the
tobacco companies to recoup the expenses they had incurred as a result of
smoking-related illnesses suffered by their citizens. When unions and other
patriae standing as applied in the tobacco litigation and its potential for future suits). For a more
critical take, see DeBow, supra note 124, at 565 (arguing that "the tobacco template could
conceivably be applied to a wide range of industries in future government litigation-including,
perhaps, makers of alcoholic beverages, fatty foods, and automobiles" and warning of a "substantial
danger that state attorneys general and local government officials will regularly succumb to the
temptation of the tobacco example, and will seek to achieve regulatory and tax outcomes through
litigation .... ).
130. Complaint at 3, Ohio v. McKesson Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00185-RBW (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
Feb. 26, 2018).
131. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
132. 46 U.S. 95, 105-07, 110 (1983) (holding that person subjected to illegal chokehold by
police lacked standing to seek an injunction, as there was no guarantee that the plaintiff would be
subjected to similar acts by police in the future); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490,
503-04 (1974) (denying that a case or controversy existed regarding discriminatory law
enforcement practices on similar grounds).
133. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that state
had standing as parens patriae to enjoin police misconduct while noting that "many individual
victims may be unable to show the likelihood of future violations of their rights"). Courts have
reasoned that, because the state represents all of its citizens, it will typically have little trouble
establishing that a harm that has occurred in the past will likely befall some citizens in the future.
Id. This sort of probabilistic reasoning generally does not work for private litigants. See generally
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491, 494-501 (2009) (denying standing to a private
environmental organization that had asserted a statistical certainty that some of its members would
be injured by some of the challenged Forest Service actions). We suspect the difference is that cases
like O'Shea and Lyons are grounded importantly in concerns about judicial intervention in state and
local governance-a concern that is radically less compelling when the state itself is the plaintiff.
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private organizations asserted similar claims, however, courts ruled that their
injuries were too remote to establish standing.1 34
Representative suits by states also enjoy a host of other procedural
advantages over their closest private analogues, class actions. Whereas class
actions are governed by a complex set of procedural requirements designed
to promote judicial economy and protect the interests of absent class
members, courts have declined to apply those rules to similar suits by
states-even as they have tightened up the requirements for private suits.' 35
Courts have likewise refused to subject parens patriae suits to the
jurisdictional requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act'36 or to
mandatory arbitration clauses. 137 And when faced with simultaneous suits by
states and by private class counsel, courts have often denied certification to
the private class action on the ground that the state suit is the "superior"
method of adjudication.1 38 As one court put it, "[T]he State should be the
preferred representative" of its citizens. 139
It is not surprising, then, that state litigation activity has increased
markedly in both volume and visibility in recent decades. For example, the
number of Supreme Court cases in which states are parties has shot up since
the 1980s-spurred in part by the creation in 1982 of the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Supreme Court Project.140 Even
more notable is the increase in states' filings as amici. Such filings are not
command performances but represent AGs' discretionary decisions to devote
limited resources to Supreme Court advocacy.141 The most comprehensive
study of state litigation in the Supreme Court reports that since 1989 states
have "become exceptionally active amicus curiae participants. They account
for 20% of all certiorari petitions accompanied by an amicus brief and 18%
134. John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes": Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis ofPrivate Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 241, 241-42 (2001).
135. See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 500-10 (detailing the procedural
requirements for private class actions versus the requirements for similar suits brought by the State).
136. Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 164 (2014); cf People v. Greenberg,
946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that suit by state AG was exempt from similar
jurisdictional rules governing private securities actions).
137. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (holding that arbitration
agreement between employee and employer did not bar EEOC from bringing enforcement action).
138. See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 505-06 (collecting cases).
139. Sage v. Appalachian Oil Co., Inc., No. 3:92-CV-176, 2:93-CV-229, 1994 WL 637443, at
*2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 1994).
140. See Douglas Ross, Safeguarding Our Federalism: Lessons for the Statesfrom the Supreme
Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 723, 727-28 (1985) (describing NAAG's genesis and functions).
Another significant institutional response was the creation of the State and Local Legal Center
(SLLC), which files amicus briefs on behalf of member associations. Id. at 728.
141. See Clayton, supra note 103, at 544 ("[T]he decision to participate as amicus curiae is
determined largely by the personal interests and felt political pressures on individual attorneys
general.").
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of the amicus briefs on the merits."l42 Today, states' participation in the
Supreme Court-both as direct parties and as amici-is second only to that
of the federal government. 14 3
The Supreme Court may be the most prominent venue for state
litigation, but it is hardly the only one. States also have become more frequent
litigants in the state and lower federal courts. Texas's Greg Abbott sued the
Obama Administration "at least 44 times";` AG Maura Healy of
Massachusetts reportedly "led or joined dozens of lawsuits and legal briefs"
challenging the Trump Administration in 2017 alone.1 45
And states are now far more likely to band together in litigation in order
to maximize their impact. For example, Paul Nolette found a marked increase
in "coordinated AG litigation"-defmed as filed lawsuits as well as
preliminary investigations involving coordinated activity by at least two
AGs-from 1980 to 2013. Professor Nolette reports: "From a consistently
low number of one to four cases a year throughout the 1980s, the quantity of
multistate cases . .. gradually increased, reaching twenty for the first time in
1996, thirty in 2002, and forty in 2008."l46 The number of AGs participating
in such cases also has grown, with a greater proportion of multistate cases
involving sixteen or more states in recent years. 147 As Nolette explains,
142. WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 104, at 48. If anything, the number of state briefs
filed understates the level of state activity. Thanks in large part to NAAG's coordination efforts,
states frequently band together on amicus briefs. A study of merits-stage state amicus briefs found
that the average number ofjoining states jumped from 2.4 in the 1970s to 13.9 in the 1990s. Clayton
& McGuire, supra note 105, at 24-25; see also WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 104, at 48
("NAAG's focus on the coordination of state amicus activity has resulted in substantial levels of
joining behavior. Accordingly, where it is rare to find more than two amici joining together on a
pre-certiorari amicus brief, on average six states coalesce . . . ."). A more recent study of state
amicus filings reveals similar joining behavior at the certiorari stage: using data on state certiorari
filings compiled by Dan Schweitzer at NAAG, Greg Goelzhauser and Nicole Vouvalis report that
"[d]uring the 2001-2009 terms, state-sponsored amicus briefs urging review in state-filed cases
were joined by an average of about 18 states, and only 5 of the 88 briefs filed were signed by a
single state." Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State Coordinating Institutions and Agenda
Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POL. REs. 819, 825 (2013). One veteran state litigator
attributes these changes in part to technological advances, noting that email has made it far easier
for dispersed AGs' offices to share drafts. See Letter from Tom Barnico, Dir. AG Program, Boston
College Law School, to authors (July 20, 2018) (on file with authors).
143. Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as
Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (2015).
144. Dan Frosch & Jacob Gershman, Abbott's Strategy in Texas: 44 Lawsuits, One Opponent:
Obama Administration, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/abbotts-
strategy-in-texas-44-lawsuits-one-opponent-obama-administration-1466778976
[https://perma.cc/D87N-QWXA].
145. Steve LeBlanc & Bob Salsberg, Massachusetts' Maura Healey Helping Lead Effort to
Litigate Trump, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2017/12/18/
massachusetts-maura-healey-helping-lead-effort-to-litigate-trump [https://perma.cc/9M9B-
GA4X].
146. NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 21 app. at 221; see also id. fig.2.1.
147. Id. at 21-22 & fig.2.2.
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"Litigation involving over half of the nation's AGs, once an unusual event,
represents over 40% of all the multistate cases conducted since 2000."'48 For
many observers, AG activism amounts to "a major shift in how political
fights are waged."1 4 9
B. Mapping State Litigation
We know states are doing more litigation, but the aggregate numbers
can only tell us so much. Although discussion of high-profile state litigation
sometimes treats it as a unitary category, that perspective obscures important
variation within the genre. This section maps state litigation into several
discrete types, based on the nature of the claims asserted. We begin with the
kinds of cases observers typically associate with state public-law litigation-
cases in which states are pitted against the federal government. These include
(1) claims that federal government action exceeds the limits of national
regulatory authority, as in the state challenges to the ACA; (2) claims that
federal government action violates aspects of the national separation of
powers, as in state challenges to President Obama's immigration policies;
and (3) claims that federal government action violates individual federal
rights, as in the state lawsuits against President Trump's travel bans. It bears
emphasis, however, that states can also shape policy outside their borders by
targeting primary behavior directly, in suits against private actors alleging
violations of either (4) state or (5) federal law.
To be sure, many prominent lawsuits will fall within more than one of
these categories. For example, challenges to President Trump's travel bans
have sometimes included both claims that the bans violate individual rights
and claims that the President has exceeded the scope of his lawful executive
authority.150 And state amicus briefs concerning the validity of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) raised both federalism and individual
rights arguments.15 1
148. Id. at 22.
149. Frosch & Gershman, supra note 144.
150. See Complaint at 11-12, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, 2017 WL
462040 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2017) (alleging individual rights violations as well as violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
151. See Brief Addressing the Merits of the State of Indiana and 16 Other States as Anicus
Curiae in Support of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at
4-8, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390993 [hereinafter
Windsor Pro-DOMA States' Brief] (arguing that neither federalism nor equal protection analysis
supported heightened scrutiny of DOMA); Brief on the Merits of the States of New York,
Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, and the District of
Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840031 [hereinafter Windsor Anti-DOMA States' Briefj (arguing
that DOMA denied equal protection and infringed states' authority to regulate marriage). There is,
moreover, important diversity within categories. As we discuss further below, the relevant legal
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Each category also includes legal claims and arguments asserted by
states in a variety of settings-including, for example, not only lawsuits but
also amicus filings by state AGs. We define our categories by the legal claim
asserted, not the form in which that claim is advanced. And, while we have
framed our categories as challenges to the legality of either federal
governmental or private action, we also include states' assertion of
arguments-often in opposition to other states-affirming the legality of
those actions.15 2
1. Federal Power Claims.-This category contains claims that federal
action exceeds the legal limits of national authority. The paradigmatic claims
are those about the reach of Congress's enumerated powers.' For example,
minutes after President Obama signed the ACA, thirteen states filed suit
arguing that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to require
individuals to buy health insurance.154 Sometimes states raise these sorts of
claims as a preemptive strike on federal legislation, as in the ACA case.
Perhaps more often, these issues are raised by private parties as defenses to
the imposition of federal requirements or penalties,' or in suits for a
constraints in each of the first three categories-federalism and separation-of-powers principles and
individual rights-may be either constitutional or statutory in character. We do not distinguish
between constitutional and statutory claims because we think that both constitutional and statutory
norms serve constitutive functions in many instances. See generally Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 464 (2007) (discussing the constitutive
role of statutory and other non-entrenched norms in structuring the government and identifying
individual rights).
152. See, e.g., Windsor Pro-DOMA States' Brief, supra note 151, at 2-3.
153. These claims almost always concern the Commerce Clause-the catch-all, default power
that sustains most federal legislation. But occasionally they involve other powers, such as
Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 512 (1997). Boerne was a private claim brought against a local government by church officials
under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). But the case drew state amici filings
on both sides. See Brief of the States of Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-
2074), 1996 WL 10282 (defending RFRA); Brief for Amici States of Ohio, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Territories of American Samoa, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands in Support of Petitioner, City of Boerne, Texas, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 695519 (attacking RFRA). And Ohio Solicitor Jeffrey
Sutton was given oral argument time to argue against RFRA's constitutionality.
154. 14 States Sue to Block Health Care Law, CNN (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIMIE/03/23/health.care.lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/3UPJ-
8C8H]; see generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547-58 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
(accepting those arguments).
155. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), for example, a criminal defendant
prosecuted for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school argued (successfully) that the
federal prohibition did not regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 551-52. In United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), an individual defendant in a civil case argued (again successfully) that the
federal private right of action for victims of "gender-motivated violence" exceeded Congress's
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declaratory judgment or an injunction seeking to bar enforcement of federal
law. 1 6 States then come in as amici-sometimes on both sides of the case.15 7
These cases are high visibility but, we want to suggest, of limited
practical importance. They're just not very promising, given the Court's
capacious understanding of national enumerated powers. 1 8 The Commerce
Clause is very, very broad-and even where it's not broad enough, there is
the Necessary and Proper Clause to fill most gaps."' (In the healthcare case,
the Taxing Clause saved the day for the ACA.)160 We may see occasional
wins for states here, but they're likely-as in Lopez-to be mostly symbolic
in their importance.161
The more significant cases are those in which Congress seeks to enlist
state officials to implement federal law but arguably lacks power to do so.
Most federal programs rely on state and local officials for enforcement and
implementation. Polarization makes states governed by the party that is out
of power in Washington particularly likely to want to opt out of such
programs. Under the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, Congress can't require
state officials to implement federal policy.1 62 Instead, Congress typically
conditions federal benefits (usually money) on state cooperation. 163
power under both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 601-
02, 604.
156. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005) (addressing claim by users of medicinal
marijuana seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the federal Controlled Substances Act, as
applied to them, exceeded Congress's Commerce power).
157. In Lopez, several states filed in support of the Gun Free School Zones Act. See Brief for
the States of Ohio, New York, and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 16007793. No state filed in
support of Mr. Lopez, but he did get a brief filed by several national organizations representing state
and local governments. See Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures, National
Governors' Association, National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, International
City/County Management Association, and National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Joined by
the National School Boards Association, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13, United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 16007619 (arguing that "the
Commerce Clause does not authorize enactment of the Gun Free School Zones Act").
158. See generally Raich, 514 U.S. at 15-19; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010) (upholding broad federal
power to imprison sexual predators under the Necessary and Proper Clause); Raich, 545 U.S. at 34-
36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to regulate noncommercial activity that affects commerce).
160. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (upholding the ACA under the Taxing Clause).
161. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 429, 476-77 (2002); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing
Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV.
at 1, 39-40 ("A roll-back of the national regulatory state was never in the cards; there are simply
too many precedential, institutional, and political constraints pressing the Court to uphold relatively
broad federal power.").
162. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
163. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
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Challengers therefore argue that federal spending conditions are
insufficiently clear or amount to federal coercion, as in the Medicaid
Expansion portion of the healthcare case'1 or in the current challenges to the
Trump order on sanctuary cities. 165 Alternatively, states' claims may focus
on whether certain federal requirements really amount to commandeering. 66
This latter class of cases operates within a cooperative federalism
context rather than a model of federalism where states have their own
exclusive sphere of regulatory jurisdiction outside of federal authority. 167 But
rather than seeking to control the content of federal policy, these cases
generally try to preserve states' ability to opt out. The Printz litigation that
established the anti-commandeering principle for state executive officers did
not try to strike down the federal Brady Act; it simply protected the right of
state and local officials not to participate in its enforcement. 168 Likewise, the
Medicaid expansion decision established an opt-out right for states. 169
Finally, an important class of federal-power claims involves state
immunities from federal regulation. These claims arise defensively, typically
REV. 1911, 1918-19, 1923-31 (1995) (noting the broad potential of conditional spending to
circumvent limits on Congress's enumerated powers). The leading case remains South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
164. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 575.
165. See, e.g., City of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
2017).
166. For example, a thorny question in the sanctuary cities litigation is the extent to which local
officials are simply being asked to cooperate with federal law enforcement in the same way any
private citizen would have to or are instead being "commandeered" into enforcing federal
immigration policy. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597-99 (E.D.
Pa. 2017); Alison Frankel, DOJ Wants to Change the Constitutional Conversation in Sanctuary
Cities Cases, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-sanctuary/doj-
wants-to-change-the-constitutional-conversation-in-sanctuary-cities-cases-idUSKCN1GJ362
[https://perma.cc/XK63-P8YQ].
167. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 26 (1995)
(contrasting "dual" and "cooperative" federalism); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 665 (2001) (categorizing
congressional acts that "invite state agencies to implement federal law" as "cooperative federalism"
programs).
168. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34.
169. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585-88 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (stating that states are free to opt out of the Medicaid expansion while remaining
within the original Medicaid program). In some circumstances a robust opt-out right could kill a
federal scheme that required cooperation, and at that extreme the difference between trying to limit
the scope of federal policy and preserving a right of opt-out dissolves. This may have been Justice
Story's hope, for example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). Although Prigg
upheld Congress's power to enact the Fugitive Slave Law and broadly construed its preemptive
force, Story may have hoped that the Court's holding that Congress could not require state and local
officials to participate in the law's enforcement would gut its effectiveness. See id. at 532, 598, 672-
73; DAvID C. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789-1888, 245 n.54 (1985). Unfortunately, he turned out to be wrong about that. See Paul
Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 664 (1993).
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in response to claims by private litigants.1 70 For a brief period during the late
1970s and early 1980s, state and local governments asserted immunities from
federal regulation itself under the now-defunct National League of Cities
doctrine.1 7 1 More enduring principles shield state governments from certain
judicial remedies when they violate federal requirements. A line of cases
stretching back over a century-but intensifying under the Rehnquist
Court-recognized a broad principle of state sovereign immunity shielding
states from damages claims brought by individuals for violations of federal
law. 172 More recent cases have constricted federal civil rights claims against
state and local officers for violations of federal statutory requirements.1 73
States have participated in these cases as both party defendants and
extensively as amici (again, often on both sides).'74
These immunity cases differ from most of our examples of state public-
law litigation in that they arise defensively-they are not, as it were,
examples of AGs like Texas's Greg Abbott going into work and suing the
federal government. Nonetheless, they do seem part of a systematic effort to
expand protections for state and local governments under federal law. It
seems fair to view Jeffrey Sutton's successful advocacy of an expansive view
of state sovereign immunity in cases like University ofAlabama v. Garretts7 1
and Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents,"' for example, as an extension of his
entrepreneurial tenure as State Solicitor of Ohio.'77
170. The convoluted saga of attempts to avoid state sovereign immunity also includes cases in
which individuals with financial claims against states enlist various other sovereign entities,
including state governments, to prosecute those claims on the individuals' behalf. These efforts have
not generally had much success. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88-89 (1883)
(holding that New Hampshire could not pursue financial claims against another state where New
Hampshire had no interest of its own).
171. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that, at least in
some circumstances, Congress may not regulate state governmental entities performing traditional
governmental functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
531 (1985); see also Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. at 1, 31-32 (discussing claims under National League of Cities as a species of
"immunity federalism").
172. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 18 (1890).
173. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) (Federal Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not create enforceable private rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (concluding no implied right of action for
disparate impact discrimination under Title VI).
174. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae States of California et al., Supporting the State of Florida,
et al., at 4, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (No. 94-12), 1995 WL 17008502 (May 3,
1995) (contending that a statute mandating state participation in federal programs was inconsistent
with principles of federalism).
175. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
176. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Judge Sutton, then in private practice at Jones Day, argued both
Garrett and Kimel on behalf of the state defendants. Id.; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356.
177. See also Alexander, 532 U.S. at 276, in which Judge Sutton, in private practice, appeared
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2. Federal Separation ofPowers Claims.-It's less intuitive to think of
States making separation of powers arguments, but one can find examples
reaching way back: in 1970, for example, Massachusetts filed an
unsuccessful original action in the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War."' Separation of powers claims have
become far more prevalent over the past decade or so. As we've noted,
polarization tends to cause gridlock, even with a nominally unified
government in Washington. And gridlock encourages the President to reach
for his pen and phone to get things done.7 9 Resulting challenges sound in
separation of powers, not federalism. But the litigation is motivated by states
that are either seeking to protect their own autonomy or to find a way to
participate in a national lawmaking process that has shifted from Congress to
the Executive Branch.
United States v. Texas-the immigration case-is a good example. 80
When President Obama extended lawful presence to millions of additional
undocumented aliens, it was hard to argue that the deferred-action programs
(Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) and Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA)) fell outside the authority of the national
government as a whole. Instead, state challengers contended that the
President lacked the authority to-as Obama himself put it-"change the
law" without going to Congress."' As was clear to all involved, Congress's
general intransigence on the immigration issue meant that a decision against
executive authority would be-for all intents and purposes-a decision
againstfederal authority more generally.
A separate set of process arguments are statutory but serve a
constitutional purpose. Again, the immigration case is a good example.
Texas's successful argument in the district court was simply that Obama's
policy change had failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because it had not gone through notice and comment. Notice and
comment isn't an insurmountable hurdle for agency lawmaking, but it does
delay implementation of national policy. More importantly, it allows states-
as counsel of record on behalf of the State of Alabama successfully opposing recognition of a private
right of action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
178. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); see also id. at 886
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that Massachusetts had authorized the suit by a specific legislative
enactment).
179. See CNN, Obama-I've Got a Pen and a Phone, YOuTuBE, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-G6tOgF.w-yl [https://perma.cc/AV7E-4AU3] (recording a speech by President Obama,
wherein he expressed frustration with congressional gridlock and his intent to take unilateral action).
180. See 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (affirming the injunction of the DAPA program and
DACA program expansions in Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606, 678 (S.D. Tex.
2015)).
181. Brief for the State Respondents, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-
674), 2016 WL 1213267, at *1.
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like anybody else-to insist on direct input into the federal lawmaking
process. It allows states to be heard at the agency just as they are supposedly
heard in Congress, although without any special status vis-d-vis other
participants. Provisions in the APA for notice and comment, as well as for
judicial review of process failures at the agency, effectively operate as
separation of powers-type constraints on the administrative state.1 82
The separation of powers principle that Congress-not the President-
makes the law also generates a second kind of challenge to federal action.
That challenge argues that executive action-like the immigration order or
the travel ban or the EPA's clean power plan-is substantively inconsistent
with the underlying statute.183 Polarization can cause such claims to multiply.
The longer gridlock persists, the more likely that new executive initiatives
will stray from the obvious purview of the original legislation. So, for
example, states challenged the Obama Administration's transgender
bathroom guidance on the ground that its definition of gender discrimination
differs from that of the Congress that enacted Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act.' 84 Likewise, when federal agencies promulgated broad "preemption
preambles" during the George W. Bush Administration, a coalition of states,
as well as a state governmental association, filed amicus briefs arguing that
these preambles exceeded the agencies' statutory mandate. 85
182. For assessments of the so-called administrative safeguards of federalism, compare Gillian
E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028, 2101-09 (2008)
(asserting that administrative law is well-suited to preserving federalism), with Stuart M. Benjamin
& Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
DuKE L.J. 2111, 2114, 2145-54 (2008) (arguing that federalism requires insistence that Congress
play the primary role).
183. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (considering challenge by
twenty-three states to EPA rule regulating air pollutants on the ground that the agency did not
consider costs of regulation as required by statute).
184. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815-16 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting
preliminary injunction on behalf of thirteen states and other plaintiffs).
185. See Brief of Amici Curiae Vermont, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming in Support of
Respondent at 4, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249); Brief of the National
Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publishing/preview/publiced preview briefs .pdfs_07_08_06_1249_RespondentAmCuNatlConf
ofStLegis.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BEW-E7YX]; see also Briefofthe Center for State
Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 6, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced preview briefs pdfs 07_08_06_1249.Respon
dentAmCuCtrStEnforcementAntitrustandConsProtLaws.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD4
H-NKFK]. On the preemption preambles, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L.REV. 227 (2007).
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A more difficult class of cases involves litigation challenging federal
government inaction. Federal administrative law generally presumes that
agency inaction-at least in the form of agency refusals to initiate
enforcement proceedings-are not subject to judicial review. 18 6 But this
presumption can sometimes be overcome, as it was by Massachusetts v.
EPA's holding that states could challenge the agency's denial of rulemaking
petitions authorized by statute."' Given Congress's continued failure to act
on climate change, "EPA regulation pursuant to [Massachusetts v. EPA] ...
has served as the core of the US federal efforts on climate change."' 88 And
where an incoming administration seeks to overturn previous executive
action-thus arguably returning to the status quo ante of inaction-states
may find greater leverage to challenge this departure from the prior baseline.
Recent litigation over the Trump Administration's "repeal" of President
Obama's DACA policy, for example, has gotten significant traction by
arguing that the repeal rested on improper reasons.'8 9 State litigation to
enforce the Executive's statutory obligations can thus force adoption and
continuation of executive policies even where national-level gridlock would
otherwise foreclose them.
3. Federal Rights Cases.-Some state challenges to federal action rely
not just on structural principles but also on individual rights arguments. In
the travel ban cases, for instance, state governments assert parens patriae
standing to raise the rights of their citizens. Sometimes states assert
proprietary interests as well; some of the state plaintiffs in the travel ban cases
argued that their state universities had been deprived of faculty and students
from abroad.'9 0 And sometimes the states participate as amici to express a
view on the scope of federal individual rights, as in the same-sex marriage
cases. 191
This category also includes state litigation activity contesting federal
rights. For example, numerous states have participated as amici opposing
186. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
187. 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
188. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Role ofLitigation in Multilevel Climate Change
Governance: Possibilities for a Lower Carbon Future? 30 ENV'T & PLAN. L.J. 303, 310 (2013).
189. See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(granting preliminary injunction against repeal of DACA program in suit by New York and fifteen
other states). Similar litigation challenges the Trump Administration's effort to overturn President
Obama's "clean power plan." See, e.g., Richard Valdmanis, States Challenge Trump Over Clean
Power Plan, SCI. Am. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/states-challenge-
trump-over-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/7JK8-A3TZ].
190. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd on other grounds, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018) (",O2 harms the State's interests because (1) students and faculty suspended from
entry are deterred from studying or teaching at the University; and (2) students who are unable to
attend the University will not pay tuition or contribute to a diverse student body.").
191. See supra notes 10 (Obergefell briefs) and 151 (Windsor briefs).
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Equal Protection challenges to affirmative action in state universities.1 92 It is
even more common to see states opposing rights claims by criminal
defendants. 19 3 Similarly, states often play defense against federal civil rights
claims brought by private litigants. (These two categories are often related,
as many federal civil rights claims involve allegations of improper actions by
state or local law enforcement.) In this latter set of cases, state governments
are often the defendants; even where they are not (in the many cases against
municipalities and their officers, for instance), they may well play a
prominent role as amici.' 94 And in all such cases, other states may support
the party asserting federal rights as amici. When he was AG of Minnesota in
the early 1960s, for example, Vice President Walter Mondale filed a brief on
behalf of twenty-two states urging the Supreme Court to expand the right to
counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.1 95
As we discuss in more detail in the following Part, these rights cases
create the potential for conflicts among states. Whenever state AGs support
claims of constitutional rights, they are-in a very real sense-arguing
against their own state's power. More than that, they are seeking to impose a
particular rule on all states. Like the statutory challenges described above,
then, individual rights cases often involve interstate conflicts over control of
federal policy. Those conflicts, moreover, can often be coded as red versus
blue. And because they frequently involve "hot button" issues, these cases
raise particular risks of politicizing the AG's office.
4. State Enforcement ofState Law that Creates National Regulation.-
As we have already noted, the tobacco litigation of the 1990s was a critical
watershed for state public-law litigation. To be sure, states have sought to
enforce their own laws in ways that affect conditions outside their
jurisdictions for a very long time.196 And local governments have also been
active in this sort of litigation-for example, in suits against the firearms
industry during the 1990s.' 97 But the most successful efforts have been
192. See Lemos & Quinn, supra note 138, at 1257.
193. See id. at 1255-56 (observing that many Republican AG briefs filed in criminal procedure
cases are not opposed by state briefs favoring the criminal defendant).
194. See, e.g., City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 235 (1999) (Ohio SG Jeffrey
Sutton, who had filed an amicus brief on behalf of twenty-nine states, arguing on the city's behalf
by leave of court).
195. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Yale Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright and Related Matters: An
Armchair Discussion Between Professor Yale Kamisar and Vice President Walter Mondale, 32 L.
& INEQ. 207, 207 (2014) (discussing Mondale's role in Gideon).
196. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 231, 236 (1907) (hearing the State
of Georgia's public nuisance claim against Tennessee copper companies for discharging noxious
gases that crossed the border into Georgia).
197. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making:
Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-
Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEXAS L. REv. 1837, 1843 (2008) ("By the late 1990s, municipalities began
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undertaken by states. Most observers seem to agree that the tobacco litigation
ushered in a new era of state activism that then spread to other regulatory
areas and types of litigation.1 98
The tobacco litigation and its contemporary analogs share two related
features that differentiate them from ordinary state enforcement of state law
against private parties. The first is that rather than a single state suing a
defendant within its jurisdiction for torts that harmed its citizens, the tobacco
litigation featured a broad coalition of states-ultimately including all of
them. 199 And the Master Settlement Agreement that ended the litigation
eventually came to include nearly all manufacturers of tobacco in the
American market. The litigation thus aimed at global peace-that is, a
comprehensive settlement among all the relevant players.
The second point is that the tobacco settlement essentially created a
nationwide regulatory regime governing cigarettes.20 0 It includes, for
example, not only payments by the defendants for past harms but also
agreements to strengthen warning labels and restrictions on advertising.
Because it applies throughout the United States and governs the activities of
virtually all tobacco companies doing business here, one could fairly say that
it might as well be a federal law.
Similar multistate litigation efforts have imposed quasi-regulatory
regimes via comprehensive settlements with major industry players in the
pharmaceutical and other industries.2 0 1 We expect this phenomenon will
continue. In the fall of 2017, for example, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts sued the credit-reporting company Equifax following
announcement of a data breach that allegedly affected over 140 million
consumers. 20 2 Massachusetts brought the suit under its own data privacy
statute, as well as a more general consumer protection statute. If other states
and credit reporting firms are drawn into this litigation, one might well see
suing the gun industry to recover the costs of law enforcement and emergency medical services
related to gun violence.").
198. See, e.g., NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 23-24.
199. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, Northern
Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands, joined the Master Settlement Agreement with the tobacco
companies. Four other states-Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas-settled their cases
separately. Supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also NAAG, supra note 90, at 388.
200. NOLETrE, supra note 13, at 24. The tobacco companies, along with NAAG, petitioned
Congress for a national legislative settlement, but no such legislation was ever enacted. Dagan &
White, supra note 121, at 369-70.
201. See NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 49-59 (offering a detailed account of the pharmaceutical
litigation); id. at 25 tbl.2.1 (listing the top fifteen industries targeted in multistate litigation).
202. See Sarah T. Reise, State and Local Governments Move Swiftly to Sue Equifax, BALLARD
SPAHR CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com
/2017/10/03/state-and-local-governents-move-swiftly-to-sue-equifax/ [https://perma.cc/K24M-
P9W7].
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another comprehensive settlement with terms that would effectively act as,
and possibly obviate, national regulation.
5. State Enforcement of Federal Law.-State AGs also can, and do,
enforce many aspects of federal law. State enforcement of federal law is
pervasive, from antitrust to consumer protection to environmental law.203 As
we explained above, this can happen either through explicit statutory
authorization or through states relying on more general private rights of
action, often asserting parens patriae standing to sue on behalf of their
citizens.204
On its face, this category of cases may not seem particularly
empowering for states, given that AGs are merely enforcing policies that
already have been written into federal statutes and regulations. Yet the level
of enforcement can have profound consequences for what the law means in
practice, and for how regulated entities view their options. That is true even
when the law's substantive requirements are perfectly clear: higher levels of
enforcement are likely to increase deterrence by raising the expected sanction
for violations.205 And when the relevant statutory or regulatory commands
are somewhat less than pellucid-as is often the case-state AGs can shape
policy on a national scale by pushing particular interpretations of vague or
ambiguous federal laws.20 6
Thus, the most interesting instances for our purposes are those where
state enforcement reflects a disagreement with national enforcement policy.
The most salient recent example was Arizona's effort to ramp up
enforcement of federal immigration laws in response to what it saw as an
abdication by federal authorities.207 Another example, with a different
political valence, would be Eliot Spitzer's effort in New York to enforce
federal environmental laws more aggressively than the federal EPA had
previously been willing to do.208
203. See generally Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 105, at 707-17 (describing the
contours of state enforcement of federal laws in a variety of areas).
204. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
205. See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 737-40 (describing the power of
enforcement).
206. See, e.g., id. at 739-40 (describing how state enforcement has molded federal antitrust
doctrine).
207. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (holding much of Arizona's effort
preempted).
208. See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 743-44 (explaining that the EPA was
embroiled with lawsuits at the time but that it adopted Spitzer's legal strategy within a few weeks,
bringing a suit against power plants that New York intervened in). We leave to one side here the
converse scenario, which occurs when states refuse to enforce federal law or repeal state laws that
parallel federal laws. These state decisions may also significantly undermine or affect federal policy.
For example, Colorado's decision to end state prohibition of most marijuana use made it
significantly more difficult for federal authorities to further national drug policies in that state. See
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Like the multistate cases described above, state enforcement of federal
law can create the equivalent of regulatory policy nationwide. Given the
interconnectedness of the national market, it's hard to confine the effects of
state enforcement within a particular state's borders. If New York
aggressively pursues Microsoft, Washington may feel aggrieved. And if pro-
environment states undermine the fortunes of big oil companies, the oil-
producing states may share in the consequences.
III. State Litigation, Politics, and Polarization
As state AGs have gained prominence, they have also attracted critics.
A prominent theme in the critiques is that state litigation has moved away
from its traditional core of defending "state interests" and into an uncertain
new realm dominated by politics, partisanship, and policy debates.209 Indeed,
such critiques sparked the creation of a dissident AG organization, the
Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA), in 1999 as a way to
"stop what they called 'government lawsuit abuse' and redirect state legal
efforts away from national tort cases and back to traditional crime
fighting."2 10 The creation of RAGA didn't do much to stem state litigation,
but it did help balance the political membership of AGs' offices. AGs used
to be overwhelmingly Democratic; there is now a much closer mix of
Democrats and Republicans-due in part to aggressive campaign
generally Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of
Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 774-
76 (2015).
209. See, e.g., supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text; NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 200-01
("The long-term effect of the federal government's invitation for AGs to influence national policy
has been to encourage AGs to define state interests much differently than in the past. A crucial
element of this shift is that while AGs have traditionally acted as representatives of their states, they
have increasingly claimed the ability to represent a broader range of interests. This includes
representing the interests of individuals as opposed to the states themselves."); Jim Copland &
Rafael A. Mangual, Left- Wing AGs Are Playing Politics with the Law, NAT'L REV. (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/09/state-attorneys-general-political-abuses-power
[https://perma.cc/3C37-URUK] ("Left-wing state attorneys general are acting less like legal
representatives of their constituents and more like partisan political activists."); Anthony Johnstone,
The Appeal of State Attorneys General in a Federal System, H-FEDHIST, H-NET REVIEWS (July
2017), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5 0 0 3 3  [https://perma.cc/Z3DS-GL92]
(reviewing Nolette, supra note 13) ("As AGs become more responsive to national interests, they
may become less responsive to their own states' interests."); Brooke A. Masters, States Flex
Prosecutorial Muscle, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A2107-2005Janl1.html [https://perma.cc/33M7-83UW] (addressing how some
business groups view AGs as "ambitious politicians more interested in making headlines than
consistent, viable policy"); Walter Olson, Opinion, Partisan Prosecutions: How State Attorneys
General Dove Into Politics, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/03/30/partisan-
prosecutions-how-state-attorneys-general-dove-into-politics/ [https://perma.cclU9WA-6EUJE]
("These days, packs of red- and blue-team AGs roam the political landscape looking for fights to
get into .... ).
210. Greenblatt, supra note 98.
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contributions and ads by the Chamber of Commerce and similar groups.21 1
Many of those newly elected Republican AGs have themselves become
active litigants, particularly during the Obama Administration.
The consequence is that it's easy to paint state litigation as a partisan
affair, with blue-state AGs challenging national policies or business practices
that are defended by their red-state counterparts-or vice versa. Viewed from
that perspective, the work of AGs seems destined to exacerbate, rather than
ameliorate, the trends toward polarization that define our national politics.
We think the picture is considerably more complicated, as this Part
explains. We begin by surveying what we know about partisanship and
polarization among state AGs themselves, and then address the question that
animates this Article: to the extent that, state litigation is "political," what
should we make of that fact?
A. Polarization, State AGs, and State Litigation
When RAGA was founded in 1999, there were only twelve Republican
AGs.2 12 Today there are twenty-seven.2 13 In the intervening years, AG
elections have not only gotten more competitive,2 14 they have also become
more high-profile and more expensive. Drawing on data from the Database
on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), Figures 1 and 2 show
the median and mean total campaign contributions reported by AG
candidates in races from 1990 to 2012.215 As the difference between the
medians and means suggests, there are outliers in both directions-but
particularly at the high end. Not all AG elections are expensive today, but
some are very expensive. In 2012, for example, seven AG candidates reported
fundraising totaling more than $1 million; Greg Abbott topped that list at
$13.9 million.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Attorney General (state executive office), BALLOTPEDIA, https:/iballotpedia.org/Attorney
General_(state executive office) [https://perma.cc/KSN8-3HMZ] (showing party control of state
AG seats).
214. Greenblatt, supra note 98 (noting that the formation of RAGA "brought the office of state
attorney general back into political play around the country").
215. Because the number of AG races in any given election cycle is not uniform, an overall
tally of total receipts would be misleading.
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These numbers must be taken with a grain of salt, particularly prior to
2000, when the data were spotty. But they are consistent with reports that
more money is flowing into AG races, much of it from out of state. 216 And
there is good reason to believe that the numbers have gone up (perhaps
sharply) since 2012. RAGA, for example, raised $16 million in 2014-up
from $470,000 in 2002.217 Both RAGA and DAGA reported raising record
sums during the first half of 2017 (up 45% and 73%, respectively, from the
same point in the prior election cycle). 2 18 Both groups are also deploying their
money more aggressively, after announcing in 2017 that they would end their
longstanding "handshake agreement that they wouldn't target seats held by
incumbents of the other party."2 19 The effects were immediate: in one 2017
race alone, RAGA and DAGA collectively spent about $10 million.220
If AG races are more contentious than they once were, and if partisan
associations like RAGA and DAGA are playing a more significant role in
those elections, what are the consequences for AGs themselves? Do AGs
reflect the same kind of partisan sorting and ideological divergence that
characterize polarization at the federal level? Measuring polarization in AGs
216. See, e.g., Dan Levine & Lawrence Hurley, Trump Bump: Court Fights Draw Big Money
into Attorney General Races, REUTERS (July 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
politics-attomeys-general/trump-bump-court-fights-draw-big-money-into-attorney-general-races-
idUSKBNIAG17K [https://perma.cc/E5Z6-YVLX] (describing spending in AG races generally);
see also Christopher R. Nolen, Election Law, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 121, 139 (2006) (reporting that
out-of-state organization contributed $2.1 million to candidate for attorney general, prompting
reforms); Andrew Brown, Big Money Funding Race for WV Attorney General, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Oct. 1,2016), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/big-money-funding-
race-for-wv-attorney-general/articleb695b5ab-94a8-5115-a860-c93b28f79743.html
[https://perma.cc/F95S-6A4U] (describing RAGA's significant contributions to the West Virginia
AG race); Kathleen Gray, Campaign Cash Flowing into Races for Attorney General, Secretary of
State in Michigan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/money/real-
estate/michigan-house-envy/2018/01/3 1/campaign-cash-flowing-into-races-attorney-general-
secretary-state-michigan/1084953001/ [https://perma.cc/GM8U-E5N3] (describing state office
campaign spending in Michigan); Jon Lender, Jepsen Solicits Special-Interest Funds to Help Out-
of-State Political Ally, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.courant.com/politics
/government-watch/hc-jepsen-herring-fundraiser-20170927-story.html [https://perma.cc/L74A-
N62W] (describing spending by Connecticut lobbyists on Virginia AG race); Ben Wieder, Big
Money Comes to State Attorney-General Races, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/us-chamber-targets-dems-in-state-attorney-
general-races/361874/ [https://perma.cc/ALW4-98HR] (describing spending in various states' AG
races).
217. Steven Mufson, Conservatives Pour Money into Races for State Attorneys General,
WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conservative-
groups-pour-money-into-races-for-state-attorneys-general/2016/09/23/7a57030c-7e86-1 1e6-8dl3-
d7c7O4ef9fd9.story.html?utm_term=.ebf3ed23a35e [https://perma.cc/ZU9C-ZXKF].
218. Levine & Hurley, supra note 216.
219. Alan Greenblatt, State AGs Used to Play Nice in Elections. Not Anymore, GOVERNING
MAG. (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-state-attorneys-general-
elections-2017-2018-raga-daga.html [https://perma.cc/2ANF-QLV4].
220. Id.
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is no easy task, given the absence of conventional measurement tools-such
as roll-call votes, which are the dominant tool for measuring ideology (and,
thus, polarization) in Congress. But the available evidence suggests that the
more general trends toward political polarization have not passed AGs by.
To the best of our knowledge, the only current measure of AG ideology is
from the DIME project, from which we drew the data on campaign
contributions above. DIME is the brainchild of Stanford political scientist
Adam Bonica, and it is more than a repository of information on campaign
finance. Professor Bonica uses the contribution data to estimate the ideology
of candidates based on the contributions they receive-"[t]he pattern of who
gives to whom."22 1 Because many donors give to candidates at all levels of
government, the ideology measures-known as CFscores-can compare the
ideology of politicians in different types of offices (e.g., legislators vs.
governors) as well as comparing different inhabitants of the same office (e.g.,
AGs from different states or AGs from the same state in different years).222
The limited information on AG races prior to 2000 makes it difficult to
draw any meaningful conclusions about trends over time, but the data do
suggest that partisan sorting is no less pronounced among AGs than among
other elected officials. Figure 3 shows the CFscores for AGs elected in 2000-
2012: positive values are more conservative, and negative values are more
liberal. As is true in Congress today, there is no overlap between the most
conservative Democrats and the most liberal Republicans. 2 23 Professor
221. Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 367 (2014).
Bonica argues that:
The idea underlying the ideological measures is straightforward. Contributors are
assumed-at least in part-to distribute funds in accordance with their evaluations of
candidate ideology. That is, contributors will on average prefer ideologically
proximate candidates to those who are more distant. The pattern of who gives to whom
allows me to simultaneously locate both contributors and recipients.
Id. For a detailed description of methodology, see id. at 368-73.
222. See id. at 369 ("In any given state, between 70% and 90% of contributors who fund state
campaigns also give to federal campaigns, providing an abundance of bridge observations ....
Candidates who run for both state and federal office provide additional bridge observations.").
223. The discerning reader will notice that the lines for the most conservative Democrats and
most liberal Republicans appear to hit the same point (just above zero), though not at the same time.
That is in fact one person: Louisiana AG Buddy Caldwell, who was elected as a Democrat in 2008
and as a Republican in 2012. (Because CFscores are based on lifetime contributions, they do not
capture a candidate's shift to the left or right.) It's worth noting that Louisiana elected the most
conservative Democratic AG in 2000 and 2004 as well. Georgia held that title in 2002 and 2006,
before that AG seat likewise flipped red in 2010. See Adam Bonica, Database on Ideology, Money
in Politics, and Elections: Public Version 2.0, STAN. U. LIBR. 2016, https://data.stanford.edu/dime
[https://perma.cc/Y49T-LQ6W]. It bears emphasis that the static nature of the CFscores we are
using here-that is, the fact that they do not capture changes in a candidate's contributor base from
one year to the next-dampens our ability to glean trends in polarization from the DIME data. Many
AGs serve multiple terms, and several states had the same AG through all or most of the period for
which data are widely available. The trend lines for those incumbent AGs will be flat, even if the
AGs' contributors-or their litigation strategies-moved to the left or the right. That said, most
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The fact that AGs from different parties are divided is not terribly
surprising, though the suggestion that they are more ideologically extreme
than most state legislators may be. The operative question for our purposes,
however, is whether trends in political polarization are being reflected in state
litigation. It's easy to see why the answer might be yes. Some observers
predict, for example, that the changes in AG elections will sharpen partisan
divides and reduce bipartisan cooperation: "It's hard to work cooperatively
with your fellow AGs if you're always wondering what they're going to use
to try to target you in the next election."225 Or, to put it more bluntly: "As
each cycle goes by, the presumption is going to be that the AG across the
table is going to destroy you if he or she can."226
Similarly, the trend toward unified government in the states is likely to
produce more polarization, and less bipartisanship, in state litigation. Until
relatively recently, it was not uncommon to find Democratic AGs in
otherwise red states.227 And, because most states had divided government,
most AGs had to contend with an opposite-party legislature or governor. It
stands to reason-and there is some evidence to support this notion,
discussed below-that AGs who hail from a different party than other state
leaders will tend to take a more moderate approach to litigation than those
who work in states with more one-sided politics. But those "purple" seats are
becoming less common, as more states turn to unified government and more
AG races follow suit. Of the thirty-one states that had unified government in
2017, at least twenty-seven had same-party AGs.228
Here too, it is easier to hypothesize about polarization than to measure
it, but what we know about state litigation suggests that partisanship is
playing a more dominant role. For example, research on state amicus briefing
indicates that AGs from different states increasingly articulate opposing
interests. Writing in 1987, Thomas Morris reported that states appeared on
opposite sides of only 2% of the cases argued before the Supreme Court.229
225. Greenblatt, supra note 219 (quoting Paul Nolette).
226. Id. (quoting Jim Tierney).
227. See Greenblatt, supra note 98 (comparing the total number of Republican AGs in the
United States in 1999 and 2003).
228. Compare NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEG., 2017 STATE & LEGISLATIVE PARTY
COMPOSITION (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/Elections/Legis-Control
2017_March_1_9%20am.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8RT-WBR7] (showing party composition of
state legislatures and governors), with Attorney General (State Executive Office), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/AttorneyGeneral_(state-executive-office) [https://perma.cc/KSN8-
3HMZ] (showing party control of state AG seats). We say "at least" because Hawaii's AG is
technically a non-partisan official, appointed by the state's elected governor. See id.
229. Morris, supra note 103, at 302 ("Most of the divisions did not consist of a significant
number of states on either side, but rather one or two states on either side or one or two dissenters
from an otherwise large number of states."). Perhaps not surprisingly, Morris found that Commerce
Clause cases were the most common sites of interstate conflict. Id.
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Such findings reinforced the view that the political developments of the
1980s and early 1990s "helped forge a new sense of shared interest between
the states .... [N]ot only have state attorneys general become more active,
they have increasingly sought to influence policy qua states in the collective
sense rather than as individual state actors."230
That sense of shared interest may have eroded in recent years. A 2014
study by Professor Nolette found significantly more interstate conflict,
particularly during the Obama Administration. Focusing on cases decided by
the Supreme Court between 1993 and 2013, Nolette examined instances in
which multiple AGs filed briefs, either as amici or parties, at the cert or merits
stage. He found a "large spike" in interstate conflicts during the last four
years of the sample.2 31 In 35% of the cases during that period, states either
squared off against each other or collaborated on briefs with a strong partisan
slant.232
In other work, Professor Nolette also documented partisan patterns in
multistate litigation in the lower federal courts. Whereas state suits against
corporations have been largely bipartisan affairs, Nolette found "wide
partisan splits among AGs" in what he calls "policy-forcing" suits-cases in
which states have "attempted to force [federal agencies] to take a more active
regulatory approach." 23 3 He found partisanship to be playing a dominant role
in "policy-blocking" litigation as well-a category of litigation that he
defines as "state legal challenges to regulatory actions by federal
policymakers" 234-though the roles were reversed. Whereas Democratic
AGs had taken the lead in "policy-forcing" litigation since the George W.
Bush Administration, Republican AGs were at the forefront of "policy-
blocking" litigation under President Obama.
Studies like Nolette's are illuminating, but they raise important
questions about how to measure partisanship and polarization in the litigation
context. One might try to code the positions advanced by AG briefs as liberal
or conservative and then determine the partisan affiliation of the AGs who
sign each brief. The difficulty, of course, is devising a system for coding
substantive positions that is both valid and reliable.2 3 5 Instead, most
230. Clayton, supra note 103, at 539.
231. Paul Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging Agendas in
an Era ofPolarized Politics, 44 PUBLlUS 451, 455-56 (2014).
232. See id at 455-57, 457 tbl.1 (discussing the increase in horizontal conflicts involving
partisan participation among AGs from 1999 through 2013).
233. NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 30-31. Specifically, Nolette argues that "[s]ince the
George W. Bush administration, policy-forcing litigation has chiefly been an avenue for Democratic
AGs to expand national regulation beyond the level preferred by Congress or federal agencies." Id.
at 31.
234. Id. at 31-32.
235. For literature discussing the problems with efforts to code judicial decisions as "liberal"
or "conservative," see Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States
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researchers have focused on the identity of the AGs who participate in the
relevant case or brief. Nolette identifies partisanship by a head count of
participating AGs. 236 That approach avoids the difficulties of categorization
that bedevil attempts to code positions by ideology, but it has its own
problems: it is insensitive to the ratio of Democratic and Republican AGs in
office, and (relatedly) focuses on the AGs who participate in a given case
rather than the AGs who opt to sit it out. The upshot is that a brief signed by
twenty Democrats and five Republicans registers the same way regardless of
whether there are twenty Democratic AGs in office or forty-five.
A different approach is to code polarization based on the number of
(say) Republican AGs participating in a case compared to the number of
Republicans then in office, as a means of calculating whether the coalition of
AGs was more Republican than would be expected by chance. A recent study
by Margaret Lemos and Kevin Quinn took that approach, focusing on the
coalitions of AGs who joined or opposed each other in amicus briefs filed in
the Supreme Court between 1980 and 2013.237 If state amicus activity were
partisan, one would expect cosigners to be from the same party and opposing
briefs to be filed by AGs from different parties. Professors Lemos and Quinn
found some partisan clustering (meaning that the group of AGs joining or
opposing a brief was significantly more or less Republican than would be
expected from a random draw of AGs then in office), but only in recent years,
and-for the most part-only in cases in which groups of AGs weighed in
on both sides.238 When AGs appeared as amici on only one side of a case,
they tended to do so in bipartisan coalitions.2 39 (There were a number of
years, however, in which there were significantly polarized Republican
coalitions-mostly in criminal procedure cases in which Republican AGs
joined an amicus brief and Democratic AGs did not participate at all.)2 4 0
Partisan patterns do not, of course, prove that partisanship is causing
AGs to act.24 1 Virtually no researchers have sought to tease out different
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2013) (finding that the labeling
of cases depended more on the preferences of the Court than on the disposition of the case);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 776-78, 780-81 (2009) (explaining the numerous variables involved in
classifying a decision); Young, Blowing Smoke, supra note 161, at 11-12 (noting that the
inconsistent nature of these classifications poses a significant problem in accurate coding).
236. In his study of amicus briefs, for example, Professor Nolette defines cases as partisan in
which Republican or Democratic AGs constituted at least 80% of participating AGs. Nolette, supra
note 231, at 455. Nolette does not specify how he identifies polarization in multistate litigation.
237. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 143, at 1233, 1243.
238. Id. at 1251-52.
239. Id. at 1268.
240. Id. at 1255-56.
241. A focus on brief-joining may also tend to overstate the importance of partisanship, in the
sense that it may capture relatively low-stakes position-taking rather than truly impactful legal
action. The AG who supplies the twentieth signature to an amicus brief is probably not devoting a
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drivers for state litigation. The leading exception is Colin Provost, whose
studies of state consumer-protection litigation have controlled for factors
such as the magnitude of harm caused to state citizens by the defendant's
conduct, the presence of consumer groups in the state, citizen ideology,
median income, and more.2 42 His findings are too complicated to summarize
briefly here, but they underscore the need for caution before drawing
conclusions about the motivations for state litigation. Provost found, for
example, that AGs' own party affiliation did not have a significant effect on
the probability of their joining a consumer-protection lawsuit, but that the
number of consumer groups in the state did-as did the ideology of state
citizens, but only in cases involving Fortune 500 companies.24 3
Taken together, the existing studies suggest two important points for our
purposes. First, context matters: the extent to which state litigation reflects
polarization among AGs depends on the kind of litigation at issue. For
example, state litigation against business interests tends to be more bipartisan
than state litigation against the federal government.
Second, AGs' own partisanship may interact with other considerations
in ways that are difficult-if not impossible-to tease out from the data
alone. For example, Professor Nolette's finding that state litigation against
corporations tends to be bipartisan might reflect the fact that some suits are
more "political" than others. But (as Nolette acknowledges) the pattern also
may be explained by more prosaic concerns: when a major company is
already settling with a large group of states, and when the main consequence
of non-participation is exclusion from the settlement proceeds, other state
AGs may see little advantage to sitting it out. 24 4
As Professor Provost's study indicates, moreover, AGs' own partisan
affiliations may be less significant in some cases than the ideological
great deal of her office's resources to the case, and her decision to join is unlikely to have much
impact on the law. Such brief-joining may offer opportunities for AGs to signal to and satisfy co-
partisans-and such behavior may in turn have ripple effects for other aspects of AGs' work-but
nonetheless is meaningfully different from, say, spearheading litigation on behalf of the state as
party.
242. See Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of US. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-
State Litigation, 10 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 1, 10, 14-15 (2010) [hereinafter Provost, Integrated
Model]; Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the
New Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS, Spring 2013, at 37, 47-49 [hereinafter Provost, State Attorneys
General]; Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General
Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 612-15 (2006) [hereinafter Provost,
Politics of Consumer Protection].
243. Provost, Integrated Model, supra note 242, at 15-17.
244. NOLETrE, supra note 13, at 28 ("When a regulatory settlement will occur regardless of
whether or not a particular AG participates, most AGs are likely to participate in order to get a share
of the settlement proceeds even if they disagree with the underlying legal theories in the threatened
lawsuit.").
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commitments of the state's citizens-or, perhaps, of other state officials. 245
It follows that we might expect to see different behavior from a Democratic
AG in an otherwise heavily Republican state than from a Democratic AG in
a resoundingly blue state. And, as more states become more solidly red or
blue, we might expect AGs to act in an increasingly partisan manner-as
some of the data suggest.
In sum, the mere fact of partisan versus bipartisan coalitions can only
tell us so much about the causes and effects of state litigation, or whether
AGs are "playing politics" rather than seeking to vindicate the interests of
their states. In order to make those kinds of assessments, we need a better
understanding of how state litigation interacts with state interests-both
institutional and regulatory. We also need a better understanding of when,
and why, "politics" should matter. We take up those questions next.
B. Horizontal and Vertical Litigation
In assessing the impact of state public litigation on polarized political
debates, it will help to distinguish between two types of conflict in federal
24
systems.246 The classic conflict is a vertical struggle between the national
government and the states. When the national government tries to extend the
reach of its Commerce or Spending powers, or when states band together to
oppose the practice of "unfunded mandates," these disputes qualify as
predominantly vertical in character.
Our federal system was originally concocted, however, to keep a lid on
a different sort of conflict-that is, horizontal conflict among states (or
groups of states). Powerful groups of states frequently try to impose their
preferences on other states. Creating a national government limited this
conflict somewhat, but it also created a potent new weapon for states to use
against one another. That weapon was the national government itself, which
one group of states may use as an instrument to impose its preferences on a
dissenting minority group of states. Classic examples here are the fugitive
slave laws, which the slaveholding states that dominated the national
government before the Civil War enacted to force the abolitionist North to
go along with slavery.247
Vertical conflict is primarily about each state's right to go its own way
on particular questions. When Alfonso Lopez successfully challenged
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to restrict guns in
245. Provost, Integrated Model, supra note 242, at 17; see also Lemos & Quinn, supra note
143, at 1263-66 (making this point and using the states' briefing in District of Columbia v. Heller
as an example).
246. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard ofJudicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 109-10 (2001) (defining and contrasting "vertical" and "horizontal
aggrandizements").
247. See id. at 121-24.
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schools,2 48 that didn't affect Texas's own right to decide whether to permit
them (it doesn't). But it did leave the decision up to Texas. And it certainly
didn't prejudice the right of other states to restrict guns in schools. Generally
speaking, the same will be true of other "federal power" claims, as we defined
them in the previous Part.
Horizontal conflict, on the other hand, now mostly takes the form of
fights for the right to control national policy. Both Texas's challenge to
DAPA and the blue states' efforts to protect DACA from repeal by the Trump
Administration are arguable examples, given the federal government's
plenary power over inmigration matters.2 49 Similarly, in Massachusetts v.
EPA, one group of stateS25 0 thought that the EPA should regulate greenhouse
gases as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act; another group 251 thought it
should not. Both were trying to make policy for the whole country-and still
are, in extensive litigation concerning President Trump's environmental
policies.252 (And lest deregulation seem to leave the issue open to state
experimentation, industry and sometimes the federal government have
argued that lax federal standards often preempt more rigorous ones at the
state level.) 253 Thus, these sorts of claims often involve conflict among states
over the content of national policy rather than carving out space for state
248. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
249. We say "arguable" because, to the extent that DACA and DAPA sought to centralize the
discretionary judgment about whom to deport in the White House or Main Justice, the defeat of
those policies might simply return us to a regime of more decentralized discretionary judgments.
Those judgments would not belong to the states--they would be made by federal agency officials-
but they might not result in any sort of centralized policy.
250. 549 U.S. 497, 505 n.2 (2007) (listing California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington).
251. Id. at 505 n.5 (listing Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah).
252. See Juliet Eilperin, NYU Law Launches New Center to Help State AGs Fight
Environmental Rollbacks, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nyu-law-launches-new-center-to-help-state-ags-fight-
environmental-rollbacks/2017/08/16/e4df8494-82ac- 1e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html
?utm_term=. 18e432b374ca [https://perma.cc/MU6Z-TJKV]. Blue state AGs announced that they
would sue to block President Trump's rollback of President Obama's "clean power plan" long
before the new plan was unveiled in the summer of 2018. See Press Release, David J. Hayes, Exec.
Dir., NYU State Energy & Envtl. Impact Ctr., State Attorneys General Ready to Sue EPA Over
Clean Power Plan Repeal (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/news/ags-
ready-to-sue-epa-over-clean-power-plan-repeal [https://perma.cc/4772-7G2G]; see also Press
Release, Office of Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG Healey Leads Statement From 20 State
Attorneys General Announcing Intent to Sue Over EPA Rollback of Clean Car Rule (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-leads-statement-from-20-state-attorneys-general-
announcing-intent-to-sue-over-epa [https://perma.cc/TK3S-PVC6].
253. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 247,257-
58 (2004) (accepting industry argument, supported by the United States as amicus, that California's
rules requiring fleet operators of vehicles to purchase low-emissions vehicles were subject to
preemption by more permissive federal standards).
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policy diversity. 254 The same is true of cases in which states seek to enforce
federal rights-constitutional or statutory-or use state law to create what is
effectively a nationwide regulatory regime.
Although one can always find exceptions and odd cases, we think we
can safely say that, generally speaking, vertical conflicts are about who
decides, while horizontal conflicts are about what is to be decided. If that's
right, then the state interests at stake in vertical cases are likely to be
institutional ones. Those interests may cash out in either a liberal or
conservative direction in any given situation, but the interests themselves-
the preference for state-level autonomy rather than top-down direction from
the federal government-are politically neutral. 255 Although many observers
have traditionally ascribed a conservative political valence to state autonomy
in general, thoughtful scholars on the Left have recognized that to be a
mistake at least since the George W. Bush administration. 256 By contrast, the
interests in horizontal cases-where the parties dispute what the uniform
254. Horizontal conflicts may also involve wealth transfers from one part of the country to
another. Southerners objected to the national tariff in the nineteenth century on the ground that it
protected infant industry in the North while resulting in higher prices for imported goods in the
South. See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 271-73 (2007). Likewise, many have argued that the 2017 national tax
overhaul's limit on the deduction for state and local taxes transfers wealth from blue to red states.
E.g., Michael Hiltzik, The Republican Tax Plan is an Arrow Aimed at Blue States like California,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fl-hiltzik-tax-california-
20171103-story.html [https://perma.cc/T26B-HEEK]. For that reason, blue states have filed suit to
challenge the tax overhaul. See Joseph De Avila, Democratic States Sue Trump Administration Over
Tax Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democratic-states-sue-
trump-adniinistration-over-tax-overhaul-1531851068. But even these fights-ostensibly over
money-were actually about far more substantive policy preferences. The tariff promoted one way
of life (industrialization) over another (agrarianism), while the tax reform favors a low tax-low
services model of state regulation over a high tax-high regulation model.
255. See Baker & Young, supra note 246, at 140-42, 152-55.
256. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DISSENT MAG. (Spring 2005),
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reclaiming-federalism [https://perma.cc/2GVP-LXCE]
("With all three branches of the national government in conservative hands, progressives have
begun to wonder whether federalism might be useful after all."); Heather K. Gerken, A New
Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY J. (Spring 2012), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24
/a-new-progressive-federalism [https://perma.cc/B9Q7-R42P] (arguing that federalism "allows
racial minorities and dissenters to act as efficacious political actors, just as members of the majority
do"). Today's California has taken up the mantle of resistance to national authority passed down
from John C. Calhoun's South Carolina. See, e.g., Don Thompson & Elliot Spagat, Jeff Sessions,
California Governor Clash as Feud Escalates, U.S.NEWS (Mar. 7,2018), http://www.usnews.com/
news/best-states/califonia/articles/2018-03-07/trump-administration-sues-california-over-
sanctuary-laws [https://perma.cc/3LFM-BBE8] (reporting new U.S. suit to preempt California's
immigrant sanctuary laws). And the next great vertical federalism conflict may well take place over
blue states' efforts to legalize marijuana. See Sadie Gurman, Sessions Terminates US Policy that
Let Legal Pot Flourish, AP NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://apnews.com/19f6bfecl5a74733b40eaffff9162bfa [https://perma.cc/YF9R-PJT7] (reporting
how Jeff Sessions's lifting of Obama-era policy "now leave[s] it up to federal prosecutors to decide
what to do when state rules collide with federal drug law").
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federal rule should be-are more likely to be shorter-term regulatory interests
with an identifiable political valence.2 57
To the extent that these observations are true, they suggest several
normative propositions-propositions that, we believe, many critiques of
state litigation today imply but rarely make explicit. The first is that in
vertical conflicts we ought to see more cooperation among states across
partisan lines to defend the institutional interests of state governments. One
terrific example is then-Alabama Solicitor General Kevin Newsom's amicus
brief on behalf of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, supporting the pot-
smokers in Gonzales v. Raich.258 Here's how Newsom led off that brief:
The Court should make no mistake: The States . .. do not appear here
to champion . .. the public policies underlying California's so-called
"compassionate [marijuana] use" law. As a matter of drug-control
policy, the amici States are basically with the Federal Government on
this one. ...
From the amici States' perspective, however, this is not a case about
drug-control policy.... This is a case about "our federalism" ....
Whether California and the other compassionate-use States are
"courageous" - or instead profoundly misguided - is not the point.
The point is that, as a sovereign member of the federal union,
California is entitled to make for itself the tough policy choices that
affect its citizens. 259
If we view states as safety valves for polarized national politics-as Part I
suggested-then we should celebrate briefs like this, where states put policy
disagreements aside to assert their shared institutional interests in limiting
national power.
A second normative proposition is that AGs should focus less of their
time and resources on horizontal conflicts. When states argue in vertical cases
that particular disputes should be left up to them, they are clearing space for
different jurisdictions to reach different conclusions on our most divisive
questions. That lowers the stakes of national politics and mitigates the effects
of polarization. But when states argue in horizontal cases that national law
must adopt their own political or moral vision and impose it nationwide, they
are participating in polarized conflict. There may be times when the moral
imperative to do that is too strong to resist. But there is a cost, because this
257. To be clear, we do not mean to say that interests in particular regulatory policies are
inherently short-term. The blue states' suit to force national limits on greenhouse gases in
Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, asserted a very long-term interest. And certainly, constitutional
arguments are long term in their consequences if adopted. The more short-term factor is the
litigating states' expectations concerning the relative propensity of either the national or state
governments to promote their favored policies at any given political moment.
258. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
259. Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336486, at *1-3.
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sort of state litigation undermines our federal system's ability to manage
polarization.
We think there is a lot of truth to these propositions, but they are not the
full story. For a variety of reasons, many state public-law lawsuits will not
fall cleanly into one category or the other. And even in clearly vertical cases,
states may have legitimate structural interests that favor national action.
Finally, horizontal litigation may serve either individual rights or other
structural values-principally separation of powers-that are independently
worth promoting.
First, many cases have both vertical and horizontal dimensions. For
instance, the ACA litigation seemed like a vertical conflict: Congress tried to
impose the ACA's requirements on the states, and the challenger states
wanted out. Striking down the ACA would not, on its face, prevent individual
states from adopting a similar regime or even a single payer system. But
many argued that the interstate healthcare market is so interconnected that no
state could feasibly impose these requirements- on its own.260 From this
perspective, if we were to have an ACA-type regime expanding healthcare
coverage for all, it could only be done at the national level. This effectively
made the conflict a horizontal one: blue states favoring such a regime had to
use the federal government to achieve it by requiring dissenting states to
conform. And by arguing the national government lacked power to enact the
ACA, the red states effectively sought to force the blue states to stick with
the prior, less universal regime.
Likewise, cases that look horizontal may have an important vertical
dimension. As we explained above, many state challenges to national policy
nowadays rely on separation of powers theories. These state challenges
concede that the national government has power to act but argue that it has
violated constitutional or statutory principles dividing labor among the
branches of the federal government. 26 1 These cases may seem horizontal
because they don't purport to limit national authority overall. But,
260. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and
the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 33, 44, 46-47 (2012)
(explaining the free-rider problem in the interstate healthcare market due to multistate insurance
operations and cross-state hospital use); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 35-50
(1995) (summarizing the traditional economic justifications for national authority).
261. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'dper curiam by
an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (summarizing the States' claims that the President's
immigration policy violated both separation of powers and the APA); Marian Johns, 14-State
Coalition Challenges Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Constitutionality, LEGAL
NEWSLINE (Aug. 6, 2018), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/511489533-14-state-coalition-
challenges-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-s-constitutionality [https://perma.cc/W75X-
MKTQ] (describing claim by Texas and thirteen other states that the CFPB violates separation of
powers principles requiring that executive officers not be unduly insulated from accountability to
the President).
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particularly in a world of polarization and gridlock, they often render federal
action impossible (or at least vanishingly unlikely) as a practical matter.2 62
Second and closely related, there can be legitimate disagreement even
in clearly vertical cases about where the institutional interests of the states
lie. International relations scholars have argued that contemporary nations
exercise their sovereignty by entering into cooperative arrangements with
other nations to address problems, like climate change or the international
drug trade, that they cannot effectively address alone.2 63 The American states
are similarly interdependent, and they have interests that can only be
vindicated by national cooperation. If pollution generated in Ohio is causing
acid rain in New Hampshire, New Hampshire's autonomy may actually be
enhanced by cooperative arrangements that restrict pollution that New
Hampshire, acting alone, would be powerless to control. That cooperative
arrangement is generally called "the federal government."2 " For this reason,
states have an institutional interest in ensuring that the national government
is strong enough-and has broad enough powers-to help them out with
regulatory problems they can't effectively address on their own.
The upshot is that we may see conflict among different groups of states
over issues-like the scope of the Commerce Clause in Raich-that are
vertical in their structure, and both groups of states may be defending their
institutional interests. That will not always be true, of course; it depends on
whether the relevant policy challenge could be addressed effectively by state-
level regulation, or whether it demands collective action. And that, in turn, is
a question on which reasonable minds will often differ.
Legitimate disagreement also exists about whether vertical claims
asserting immunities against federal remedies actually foster the sort of
autonomy that can mitigate national polarization. One of us has argued that
the Supreme Court's expansive state sovereign immunity jurisprudence does
little for state autonomy because it simply shields states from certain federal
remedies (principally money damages) rather than restricting the scope of
federal regulation altogether.265 Cases like Garrett and Kimel, for example,
did not take the potentially contentious issue of disability rights off the
national agenda; they simply allowed state institutions to get away with
262. See generally Clark, supra note 88, at 1339-41 (explaining how enforcing the rules of the
federal lawmaking process safeguards federalism).
263. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26-29 (1995).
264. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (arguing that the purpose of federal
power generally is to solve collective action problems).
265. See, e.g., Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 171, at 51-58; Ernest A. Young,
The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 63-65, 112-15, 121 (2004).
100 [Vol. 97:43
State Public-Law Litigation
violating federal law without paying damages.266 Yet this argument may
underappreciate the extent to which removing the threat of damages awards
enables the state officials administering federal regulatory regimes to reshape
those regimes to conform more closely to states' preferences. To the extent
that state sovereign immunity or limits on the scope of § 1983 shield instances
of "uncooperative federalism," 267 immunity claims may play a role similar to
other assertions of vertical autonomy rights. We suspect this possibility is
minor2 68 but cannot discount it entirely.
All of this helps refine the normative propositions we outlined above.
For those who believe that AGs have a critical role to play in vindicating the
states' long-term institutional interests-and we count ourselves as members
of that camp-it is not enough to ask whether AGs are litigating in bipartisan
coalitions or trying to "block" federal policy rather than to "force" it.
Likewise, when we observe AGs lining up on both sides of a case, or seeking
to impose their own views of good policy on the rest of the nation, we cannot
(without more) conclude that any of the participating AGs is putting short-
term political or policy gains above state interests. There is no substitute for
parsing the particular merits issues in each individual case.
As we have explained, what matters from a federalism perspective is
whether the state's litigating position could, if successful, enable that state to
"go its own way." In an interconnected economy such as ours, one state's
autonomy will sometimes be another state's shackles, and we should not be
surprised that many such policy disagreements play out along partisan lines.
It does not follow, however, that state AGs are doing anything other than
playing their traditional role as "representatives of their states" 269 when they
push for more rather than less federal law.
266. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). States remain subject to federal requirements, however, and
plaintiffs can often secure injunctive relief against them and (sometimes) damages from the
responsible state officers. Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State
Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And
How Not To), 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1037, 1095 (2001).
267. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 90, at 1310.
268. The § 1983 cases are probably more important than the state sovereign immunity decisions
in this regard. Where the state asserts sovereign immunity, individual officers-the "uncooperative
federalists" celebrated by Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken-may still be liable for money
damages. But cases like Gonzaga University v. Doe leave state officials who are "uncooperatively"
administering federal spending power regimes subject only to the cutoff of federal funds by the
responsible federal agency. See 536 U.S. 273, 279, 283, 286-89 (2003) (rejecting private
enforcement under § 1983 of a federal conditional spending statute). That remedy involves
considerable political costs and, as a result, is rarely attempted in practice. See Rosado v. Wyman,
399 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (characterizing the cutoff of federal funds as a "drastic sanction").
269. See NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 200-01 (arguing that state AGs opposing state
policymaking autonomy have departed from their traditional role).
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That said, there have been-and will continue to be-important cases in
which state AGs use litigation to lock in particular policies in ways that run
counter to state autonomy. For example, although United States v. Windsor
seemed to emphasize the importance of the states' right to define marriage
for themselves and condemned the federal Defense of Marriage Act's
interference with state family law,270 the Court's decision in Obergefell
imposed a single national answer to the question of same-sex marriage.271
That resolution left people concentrated in blue states very happy, but it
imposed a piece of their social vision on an unwilling group of red states.
And in arguing against the rights claims in Windsor and in favor of the
claimants in Obergefell, some of the states made arguments that may be
invoked to undermine state interests in future litigation concerning state
autonomy.27 2
Perhaps not surprisingly, the briefing patterns in Windsor and
Obergefell were decidedly partisan. Thirty-six states filed amicus briefs in
Obergefell: nineteen in support of same-sex marriage rights and seventeen
opposed. The AGs supporting the rights claim were all Democrats, while
those opposing the claim were all Republicans. 273 The states arguing against
the rights were, moreover, pretty solidly red: fourteen had a unified
Republican government; two had Republican-controlled legislatures and
Democratic governors; and one had a Republican-controlled legislature and
an independent governor.2 7 4 The states on the pro-rights brief were more
mixed: only seven had a unified Democratic government; six had Republican
governors; and in nine the Republican party controlled one or both houses of
the legislature.2 75 Thus, in many of those states, the Democratic AG was
taking a position on marriage that other members of state government
(perhaps a majority) may have opposed. It is surely no coincidence that same-
sex marriage was already legal in every one of the pro-rights states, either as
270. 570 U.S. 744, 766-68 (2013).
271. Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
272. See, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 10, at 33 ("[lI]t is indisputable
that whenever such conflicts arise [between federalism and individual rights], the Fourteenth
Amendment trumps federalism" and suggesting that federalism only matters if it pushes in the same
direction as individual rights claims); Windsor Pro-DOMA States' Brief, supra note 151, at 7-8
(questioning whether "federalism ha[s] any residual connection to the equal protection standard
applicable to the federal government" and objecting "to the idea of leveraging individual rights
claims using the Constitution's structural safeguards").
273. See supra note 10 for briefs filed by state amici. Party affiliations of state AGs can be
found at https://ballotpedia.org/AttomeyGeneral-(state-executiveoffice) [https://perma.cc
/YX8Q-6Q2E].
274. See NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 74 (showing party control of state
governments).
275. Id. In some of those states, the Republican party controlled both the governor's seat and
part of the legislature.
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a result of a court ruling or (more commonly) a state statute. 27 6 Similarly in
Windsor, the seventeen Republican AGs who signed the state brief defending
DOMA-a restriction on state power-hailed from states with constitutional
provisions or legislation consistent with the Act.277
This is horizontal conflict in action: states using federal law (statutory
or constitutional) to extend their own vision of the good nationwide. Even if
one thinks-as we do-that justice required the result in Obergefell, one
might nevertheless acknowledge its significant federalism costs, as well as
the polarizing effects of state participation in social conflict. The federalism
side of the equation is complicated by the fact that one of the most important
things states do is to define themselves as moral and political communities
by taking positions on issues that matter to their citizens. Same-sex marriage
is one of those defining questions that affirms a community's sense of itself
as progressive and inclusive on the one hand or traditionalist and religious on
the other. And given that Obergefell came down to a disagreement about the
definition of "marriage," it was arguably appropriate for the institutions
chiefly charged with defining that concept in our system-state
governments-to weigh in.278 The fact that the pro-rights states were making
a statement against interest, to some extent, may have made their arguments
that much more weighty.279 More broadly, it may well promote state interests
in the long term for states to be recognized as sources of important insights
276. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26,2015) http://www.pewforunm.
org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/DCN4-KRMC] (showing
same-sex marriage laws over time).
277. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 143, at 1258. The briefing patterns in District of Columbia v.
Heller-concerning the individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment-are perhaps
even more interesting in this regard. The states filed warring amicus briefs in Heller, and the anti-
gun brief was signed by Democratic AGs only. Yet Democrats also accounted for fifteen of the
thirty-one AGs who signed the pro-gun brief-"arguing not only against the typical Democratic
position on guns, but also against state power." The likely explanation is that "virtually all of the
AGs on the pro-gun brief hailed from states in the West, Midwest, and South-where support for
gun rights typically is strongest." See id. at 1263-64. Similarly, the AGs who signed pro-gun amicus
briefs in McDonald, arguing that the Second Amendment right to bear arms should be incorporated
against the states, represented states that already guaranteed "an 'individual' right to keep and bear
arms in their own constitutions, often in terms more expansive than those in the Second
Amendment." Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and State Attorneys General, 122 HARV.
L. REv. F. 108, 111 (2011).
278. Cf Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States
v. Windsor, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REv., at 117, 133-37 (2013) (discussing this aspect of the
same-sex marriage debate).
279. See Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REv. 355, 366 (2012) (highlighting "those instances where a large
number of SAGs file amicus briefs, often jointly, that take a position against the presumed state
interest in a federalism dispute and when the Justices appear to take special note of that
incongruence when rendering that decision").
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on questions like this.280 At the very least, we acknowledge that the cost to
federalism may be worth paying in important cases.
The same may be true of other horizontal claims, such as separation of
powers challenges to executive unilateralism that do not foreclose federal
legislation. If national policymaking is likely one way or another, there may
be no immediate payoff from the perspective of federalism. Yet the longer-
term effect of such litigation may be to reinforce structural limitations on
federal executive authority that, on the whole, work to the benefit of the
states.2 81 As in the individual rights setting, moreover, there may be an
independent value to state participation in fundamental questions about the
structure of American government.
The question remains whether distinctly partisan litigating patterns by
state AGs might deepen the social and political cleavages that mark this era
of intense polarization. We have no doubt that much state litigation is
motivated by partisan considerations--either the need to generate partisan
support for a particular AG's future ambitions or the desire to vindicate
sincere views about the law that happen to correspond to the positions taken
by one's political party.2 82 Even clearly vertical claims asserting institutional
interests can be brought for partisan reasons, because a particular state (or its
AG) is simply opposed to national policy on political grounds and wants to
be free of it.
We think that's fine, actually. The objection to partisan motivations for
state litigation seems to be that they render that litigation opportunistic. But
it is hard to say why this sort of opportunism is necessarily a bad thing. In
Federalist 51, Madison says that we're counting on the selfish interests of
particular officials to create incentives to protect the institutional interests of
the various parts of the government. Opportunism, in other words, is the
foundation of both separation of powers and federalism.283
280. See generally Francis, supra note 91, at 1048-51 (arguing that states benefit from voicing
their views on federal law through litigation); cf Solimine, supra note 279, at 375-76 (offering a
normative defense, grounded in a variation on political-safeguards theory, of justices' apparent
reliance on state amicus briefs).
281. See supra subpart I(C); see also Johns, supra note 261 (noting separation of powers
challenge to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
282. Empirical research on the law and politics divide has yet to come up with any good way
to separate "legal" views about the content of the law from "political" or "partisan" views about
how cases should come out. See generally Young, Blowing Smoke, supra note 161, at 8-17. Our
friends Scot Powe and H.W. Perry have demonstrated, moreover, that each party has a relatively
coherent set of views about the content of the law-the reach of the Commerce Clause, say, or the
extent of the President's unilateral authority-that correlate strongly to party but nonetheless
represent coherent legal positions. See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the
Constitution, 21 CONST. COMMENTARIES 641, 645, 695 (2004). We are willing to describe a legal
view that correlates strongly to party as "partisan" in an important sense, with the caveat that the
term should not be pejorative in that context and is not necessarily an antonym to "legal."
283. See Young, Dark Side, supra note 79, at 1308-10.
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Nevertheless, there is a somewhat different reason to worry about
partisan motivations-a reason that goes to the heart of our exploration of
state public-law litigation and polarization. One might grant the point about
Madisonian contestation and still worry about the consequences of branding
contentious legal issues as "red" or "blue." It bears emphasis that the relevant
cases would, for the most part, be brought with or without the states: most
litigation in which AGs participate either already involves other plaintiffs-
typically private individuals or organizations 284-or could be brought by
private parties instead of states. One might therefore take the view that state
participation serves only to exacerbate the ill effects of polarization, by
bringing explicitly partisan warfare to the courts. That may well be a cost,
but it depends on a comparative assessment, not only of different categories
of state litigation-our focus thus far-but also of state litigation and its
alternatives, a question we take up in the next Part.
IV. State Governments as Public-Law Litigators
Any normative assessment of state public-law litigation must contend
with a comparative question: state litigation as compared to what? One
obvious alternative to litigation (regardless of the parties) is regulation, and
a common strain in critiques of state litigation is that it crowds out other more
democratic means of resolving contested policy questions.285 That critique
might gain force to the extent that state litigation itself appears to be a partisan
affair, as partisan political issues seem best resolved through political
processes. But the force of the objection depends on whether more
democratic-and straightforwardly political-modes of policymaking are in
fact meaningful alternatives, and on how litigation by states compares to the
alternative of litigation by private individuals and groups. This Part explores
those comparative questions, situating state litigation within the broader
phenomenon of public-law litigation generally.
284. We say "typically" because state AGs sometimes litigate alongside federal agencies as
well. See, e.g., NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 51-55 (describing coordinated litigation by state and
federal agencies targeting pharmaceutical pricing practices); PHILIP A. LEHMAN, N.C. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL
SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 1, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal
/documents/huddoc?id=natlsetexecsum%282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR4X-MR96] (describing
joint state-federal settlement involving "robo signing" practices by mortgage banks).
285. E.g., NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 203-04 ("Rather than relying on typical policymaking
processes such as legislation or rule making, the AGs use the tools of adversarial legalism to
influence policy."); Margaret A. Little, Pirates at the Parchment Gates: How State Attorneys
General Violate the Constitution and Shower Billions on Trial Lawyers, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.
ISSUE ANALYSIS, 2017, at 3 ("These lawsuits violate the Constitution's separation of powers,
particularly the assignment of lawmaking, taxing, and expenditure powers to the legislature.");
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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A. State Lawsuits as a Subset ofPublic-Law Litigation
As we have seen, state litigation sometimes has the practical effect of
setting policy for the nation as a whole, and it generally does so outside the
normal lawmaking processes for establishing federal regulatory norms. The
states' tobacco settlement, for example, established nationwide rules for
tobacco companies that bound basically the entire industry-all without the
enactment of any federal statute or regulation. Critics have seized on this
feature of state litigation, arguing that AGs are taking contested, and often
deeply partisan, issues off the democratic table and throwing them instead to
the courts.
Such criticisms find longstanding analogues in critiques of public-law
litigation, even when it is undertaken by private parties and nongovernmental
organizations. At least since the 1960s, public-law litigation has been a
central part of the American legal landscape. Some of this litigation has been
constitutional, such as the NAACP's campaign against Jim Crow, and some
has been statutory, such as litigation by the Sierra Club, the National
Resources Defense Council, and other groups to enforce environmental
standards. But there is no doubt that American public law counts on
nongovernmental actors to develop and enforce critical constitutional and
statutory norms. Elaboration and implementation of legal norms through
adversarial litigation is, in Robert Kagan's memorable phrase, "the American
way of law."286
In his seminal article four decades ago, Abram Chayes observed that
"the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do
not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead,
the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies."28 7 Similarly, the influential Hart and Wechsler casebook
documents a shift from a "dispute resolution" model of judicial power (in
which judicial articulation and implementation of norms arise out of deciding
concrete disputes between private parties) to a "public rights" or "law
declaration" model (in which litigation is a vehicle for articulating public
norms of broad applicability beyond the parties to the case).28 8 Resistance to
the public rights model of litigation has often centered on concerns about
courts' role in governance.2 8 9 As Professor Chayes acknowledged, public-
286. KAGAN, supra note 17.
287. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
288. FALLON ET AL., supra note 100, at 3-76; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1979) ("The task ofa judge, then,
should be seen as giving meaning to our public values and adjudication as the process through which
that meaning is revealed or elaborated.").
289. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 233 (2010) (noting that "[a]mong the most frequent criticisms" of the "large
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law litigation tends to produce relief that is not "confined in its impact to the
immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible
and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for many
persons including absentees." 29 0 Just as state AGs' settlements over tobacco
and prescription drug pricing effectively produced national regulatory
regimes,291 public-law litigation brought by private parties and NGOs has
often involved not only judicial lawmaking but also the establishment of
ongoing remedial regimes affecting large swaths of society. And it has been
criticized accordingly: like state litigation, public-law litigation is often
charged with blurring the line between litigation and legislation and with
establishing ongoing regulatory regimes outside the normal lawmaking
process.292
A related set of criticisms focuses on the practical impact of public-law
litigation on governance. Using litigation to articulate and implement legal
norms is an important aspect of what Robert Kagan called "adversarial
legalism," which he decried as "a markedly inefficient, complex, costly,
punitive, and unpredictable method of govemance and dispute resolution." 2 93
The "complexity, fearsomeness, and unpredictability" of American-style
litigation "often deter the assertion of meritorious legal claims and compel
the compromise of meritorious defenses"; worse, Kagan suggests,
"Adversarial legalism inspires legal defensiveness and contentiousness,
role of courts and lawsuits in American policy implementation" is "that it is deeply undemocratic,
unsuited to a political community committed to representative democracy and legislative
supremacy"); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV.
428, 428 (1977) (observing that institutional reform litigation places judges "in a new role: they
become responsible for implementing broad reforms in complex administrative systems, without
ordinarily having expertise in either public administration or the particular institutional field in
question").
290. Chayes, supra note 287, at 1302.
291. See NOLETTE, supra note 13, at 22-24, 45-53.
292. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 686, 707-12 (1978). Moreover, to the extent that state AGs can
use the proceeds of prior litigation to fund their ongoing activities, they may be able to set their own
agendas without the same level of supervision provided by the typical appropriations process. See
supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing "revolving-fund" statutes, which permit some
state AGs to retain certain litigation proceeds); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 125, at 873-74
(suggesting how self-funding mechanisms for public enforcers might interact with the appropriation
process).
293. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 4; see also id. at 198-206 (emphasizing the expense,
inefficiencies, and uncertainty resulting from a regulatory system that has litigation at its center).
We take "adversarial legalism" to be a broader category than "public law litigation." As Sean
Farhang has pointed out, "[t]he vast bulk of private litigation enforcing federal statutes (well over
90 percent) is neither a story of impact litigation by interest groups seeking to make policy, nor of
suits challenging the policymaking prerogatives of national authorities." FARHANG, supra note 289,
at 11.
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which often impede socially constructive cooperation, governmental action,
and economic development, alienating many citizens from the law itself." 2 94
Finally, the notion--often implicit in critiques of programmatic state
litigation-that AGs should stick to more prosaic and uncontroversial
functions, like enforcing the auto lemon laws, likewise echoes the broader
literature on public-law litigation. Critics of the federal Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) during the 104th Congress, for example, prohibited LSC
grantees from filing class actions on the ground that "impact litigation" was
a distraction from providing bread-and-butter services to individual indigent
clients.295 The class action literature warns that cause-oriented lawyers may
be poorly situated to represent the interests of some of their clients, who may
be more concerned about more immediate interests than advancing the
broader cause.296 More generally, some commentators have defended the
private dispute resolution model as better suited to the institutional
competences and legitimacy of courts.29 7 State AGs, in other words, are
hardly the only people involved in public-law litigation who have been urged
to stick to a less grandiose conception of their institutional role.
The fact that common criticisms of state public litigation apply, for the
most part, to public-law litigation generally does not mean those criticisms
are unimportant. But it does raise the "compared to what?" question we
flagged at the beginning of this Part. Robert Kagan grounds the adversarial
legalistic structure of our governance in the combination of Americans'
demand for justice and distrust of government.29 8 Similarly, Sean Farhang
attributes the pervasiveness of private enforcement of public regulation to
political polarization and frequent bouts of divided government.299
None of these features of American public life are going away anytime
soon. On the contrary, as Part I suggested, current rates of polarization may
make conventionally "political" solutions to contested policy questions
especially unlikely, especially at the federal level. Meanwhile, given the
central role that public-law litigation plays in our legal system, reining in
state AGs would not (in most cases) result in less adversarial legalism, but
294. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 4.
295. See Legal Services Corporation, Supplementary Information Regarding the Final Rule on
Class Action Participation, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,754 (Dec. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1617)
("The legislative history of this provision indicates an intent that legal services programs should
focus their resources on representation of individual poor clients and not be involved in any class
actions.").
296. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471, 490-91, 493 (1976) (discussing the
potential conflict in civil rights cases between the ideological goals of class action lawyers and the
best interests of their clients).
297. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,
394-95, 400-05 (1978) (arguing that "polycentric" problems are best solved by legislators).
298. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 229.
299. FARHANG, supra note 289, at 216-17.
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simply a shift from state litigation to litigation by class action lawyers, NGOs,
and the like.
In short, the alternative to much public litigation by states is probably
not-or at least often not-resolution of the underlying controversy by
political or bureaucratic means. In our view, then, the more salient question
is one that has been largely ignored in the literature to date: how do states
compare with other institutional options for pursuing public-law litigation?
B. States as Aggregate Litigants
Public-law litigation typically asserts claims on behalf of diffuse
interests, such as consumers, racial minorities, or persons exposed to
environmental harms. One of the central questions in American procedural
law is how to facilitate litigation by numerous and diffuse persons-such as
citizens who benefit from a clean environment-who would likely not have
either the incentives or the wherewithal to bring individual lawsuits. The
class action is the classic solution, though there is also multi-district
litigation, the mass action permitted under some states' laws, and the rule that
organizations can have standing to sue on behalf of their members. We think
it makes sense to view state governments as another such mechanism, and so
it will be useful to compare state governmental plaintiffs to other means for
aggregating diffuse interests in litigation.
We begin with points of similarity. States have many of the same
interests that private parties do, and in many cases state litigation will have
private analogs (or may be brought contemporaneously with private parties).
States own property, for example, and they enter into contracts. And not
surprisingly, when they suffer injuries to these sorts of proprietary interests,
states have no trouble establishing their standing to sue.oo
What may be less obvious is that these sorts of interests may support
important forms of public-law litigation against the national government. For
instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Bay State and several other state
governments sought to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act.3 01 Although the Supreme Court's ruling on standing relied
importantly on the Commonwealth's sovereign interests, the Court noted that
"Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be
affected"' by climate change.30 2
300. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
406-07 (1995).
301. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
302. Id. at 519. It is hard to tell whether Massachusetts could have established standing based
on this ownership interest alone. We think, however, that the real difficulty with Massachusetts's
claim for standing involved the causation elements of standing. As we discuss further infra, the
causes of climate change are so multifarious, and the likelihood that any given regulatory change
would redress it are so murky, that "special solicitude" for the Commonwealth's state-ness may
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Likewise, an important category of legal conflict between the national
and state governments involves cooperative federalism programs in which
states participate in exchange for federal funds. The Court frequently likens
these statutory regimes to contracts between the national government and the
states, and it seems clear that state governments could challenge federal
administration of the regime based on their contractual interest in enforcing
the terms of the deal as the states understand them.303
States also have a range of non-proprietary interests that arise out of
being governments. Such interests are divvied up into confusing categories
of "sovereign" and "quasi-sovereign" interests, 30 though most are relatively
straightforward without the terminology. Governments often have
responsibilities and prerogatives-regulatory and otherwise-with respect to
property they do not own; hence Massachusetts had an interest in
"preserv[ing] its sovereign territory" in the climate change case.3 05
Governments also have responsibilities to provide benefits to their citizens
that can be increased by harmful activity; recall that, in the tobacco litigation,
states sued to redress their increased Medicaid expenses arising from their
citizens' tobacco use.306 And because governments have regulatory
responsibilities, they suffer cognizable injuries when they are prevented from
enforcing their own laws. That is why, for example, a state government that
intervenes in litigation contesting the validity of a state statute has standing
to appeal a judgment striking the statute down, even if neither of the original
parties files an appeal.307
Similarly, state governments can be injured by actions that change or
make it more difficult to perform their regulatory responsibilities.3 0 s In the
Texas immigration case, the state argued that it had certain legal
have been necessary to get it over the hump. But that goes to causation, not to whether the ownership
interest was sufficient to support the requisite "injury in fact."
303. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(likening spending-power legislation to contracts between the federal and state governments);
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) (entertaining a state's challenge to administration of
a federal grant-in-aid program).
304. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02
(1982) (outlining the proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests of states).
305. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519.
306. See, e.g., Complaint at 42, Florida v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH, 1996 WL
788371 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.), http://www.tobaccoontrial.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/1994-
Florida-Attomey-General-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/23D5-57TV].
307. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (holding that "a State clearly has a
legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes"); see also Kathryn A. Watts
& Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global
Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029, 1035 (2008) (noting that "the state ... has a sovereign interest
in preserving its own law" that "should be sufficient for Article m purposes").
308. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that a private organization has Article III injury
in fact when a defendant's practices impair the organization's ability to provide services to the
population it serves. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
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responsibilities to all persons lawfully present within its jurisdiction; it was
required, for example, to issue such persons drivers' licenses at a net cost to
the State of about $130 per license.309 This example simply illustrated
concretely the basic truth that expanding the population for which a state is
responsible inevitably increases the burdens of educating, policing, and
otherwise supporting that population.3"o Similarly, Massachusetts's recent
challenge to the Trump Administration's expansion of religious exemptions
to the ACA's contraceptive mandate stressed that, under state law, reductions
in employers' federal insurance coverage obligations would trigger
corresponding costs as the Commonwealth became obligated to fill any
resulting gaps.3" More generally, because state governments are pervasively
involved in cooperative federalism arrangements with federal agencies-
sharing regulatory responsibilities over benefits programs, education,
environmental protection, homeland security, and any number of other
areas-changes in federal regulation will often impact the rights and
obligations of state governments under these schemes.
Finally, in addition to pursuing their own interests, state governments
frequently sue as parens patriae on behalf of their citizens. Parens patriae
standing typically requires that the state assert a "quasi-sovereign" interest-
that is, "a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its
populace."312 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that parens patriae is a
"judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition."3 13
But the concept becomes somewhat more tractable when considered
alongside more conventional (private) forms of claim aggregation. When a
state like Massachusetts or Texas files a lawsuit on behalf of its citizens and
relies on injuries to their interests to support its claim to standing, it is
typically doing something akin to what the NAACP and the Sierra Club do
when they file lawsuits on behalf of their members.3 14
309. Brief for the State Respondents at 19, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No.
15-674).
310. See Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Courts Scholars and Southeastern Legal Foundation in
Support of Respondents at 7-9, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674). Mr.
Young was counsel of record and primary author on this brief.
311. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 301 F. Supp. 3d 248, 255-56
(D. Mass. 2018). The district court rejected this interest as insufficiently certain to support Article
III standing, see id. at 258-65, and appeal is pending in the First Circuit as this Article goes to press.
One of us has filed an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth's standing to sue, while
remaining agnostic on any issues on the merits. See Brief of Professor Ernest A. Young as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Urging Reversal, No. 18-1514, Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (filed Sept. 24, 2018).
312. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
313. Id. at 601.
314. Dissenting in Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that "[j]ust
as an association suing on behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members
but that at least one satisfies Article III requirements, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign
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The hombook doctrine of organizational standing allows an association
or other membership organization to sue on behalf of its members so long as
"(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose;
and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit." 3 1  Many national
organizations that frequently file claims in federal court are comparable in
size to the states. The Sierra Club, for example, claims three and a half million
members-enough to be the thirtieth most populous state in the Union, just
behind Connecticut and ahead of Iowa.316 The American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP) is roughly the size of California.3 17 Such
organizations may sue when they can show that at least one member has
suffered (or will suffer) an injury in fact.3 18 In order to establish standing as
parens patriae, by contrast, a state must show that the claimed injury affects
a "sufficiently substantial segment of [the state's] population."31 9 That
requirement is not terribly demanding, 32 0 but it does erect a hurdle that private
organizations need not overcome.
Parens patriae cases also markedly resemble private class actions, as
state AGs represent the interests of citizens who are not themselves formally
parties to the suit. The resemblance holds regardless of whether AGs are
pursuing monetary remedies for citizens321 or seeking injunctive or
interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article 111." 549 U.S. 497, 538
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts was objecting to the notion that a state's unique character
"dilutes the bedrock requirement of showing injury, causation, and redressability to satisfy
Article Ill." Id. But he offered no reason why a state that could meet those requirements should have
less right to represent its citizens than an association has to represent its members.
315. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
316. Compare Who We Are, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/about
[https://perma.cc/8BMJ-DQKG] (estimating that Sierra Club includes 3.5 million members and
supporters), with Wikipedia, List States and Territories of the United States by Population,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List ofU.S._states andterritoriesby-population
[https://perma.cc/58AC-4BLD] (reporting Connecticut's population as 3,588,184 and Iowa's as
3,145,711).
317. Compare Social Impact, AM. ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, https://www.aarp.org/about-
aarp/company/social-impact/ [https://perma.cc/362Y-GFS3] (claiming "nearly 38 million
members"), with Wikipedia, List States and Territories of the United States by Population, supra
note 316 (reporting California's estimated 2017 population as 39,536,653 persons).
318. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (establishing that an "association must
allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result
of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justifiable case had the members
themselves brought suit").
319. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). That
requirement serves to differentiate the state's interest from "the interests of particular private
parties," and to ensure that the state is "more than a nominal party." Id.
320. See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 495 & n.37 (describing courts' treatment
of the requirement).
321. Id. at 499 (emphasizing similarities between state litigation and damages class actions and
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declaratory relief.3 22 Indeed, "parens patriae and private class actions often
proceed in tandem, with public and private attorneys working together" to
pursue common goals.323
These many points of similarity between state public-law litigation and
private alternatives underscore the need to situate the work of state AGs
within the broader litigation landscape. In many cases-though not all, a
significant qualification to which we return below-state litigation will
operate as a supplement to, or a substitute for, similar litigation by private
individuals or groups. Understanding state litigation that way helps highlight
its comparative strengths, while also focusing attention on potential
weaknesses.
C. Democratic Litigation?
The most obvious, and important, difference between state and private
litigation is that states are democratic governments. The overwhelming
majority of state AGs are independently elected, and those who are not are
usually accountable to an elected governor.3 24 State law generally provides
other checks and balances, such as legislative oversight, budgetary controls,
or sunshine laws requiring some degree of public transparency. These
mechanisms are by no means perfect,3 25 but they do suggest that a state AG
should be more accountable to a state's citizens than the leaders of an
organization like the Sierra Club are to its members.
In an ideal world, moreover, one might imagine that AGs' obligation to
represent diverse constituencies of voters might cause them to adopt more
moderate litigating positions than private groups--thereby ameliorating
some of the concerns about partisanship and polarization that we explored
above. A state AG represents the whole state-not just the party that elected
her.326 And although partisan assumptions surely shape every AG's
conception of the public interest, we have little doubt that AGs do frame that
interest more broadly. State AGs' responsibilities cut across a wide range of
citing sources).
322. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Three Models ofAdjudicative Representation, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1743, 1757-63 (2017) (comparing public suits and injunctive class actions of the sort
that public-interest groups often spearhead).
323. Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 499.
324. In Tennessee, the state AG is appointed by the Supreme Court, considered an officer of
the judicial branch, and serves an eight-year term. See TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 5. This arrangement
appears to be unique. Attorney General of Tennessee, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/AttorneyGeneral-of_Tennessee [https://perma.cc/C6ZC-4UE8].
325. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 929 (2017) (discussing some
weaknesses of public accountability mechanisms).
326. NAAG, supra note 95, at 45 (explaining that the AG is the "principal legal representative
of the public interest for all citizens").
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issues, from criminal enforcement to consumer welfare to environmental
protection to preventing terrorism.3 2 7 They are, therefore, accountable and
responsive to broader interests than the subset of their citizens directly
affected by a particular lawsuit. And because state AGs increasingly act on a
national stage-collaborating with other states, taking part in cooperative
federalism schemes with national officials, and soliciting campaign
contributions from national interest groups-they cannot afford to take too
parochial a perspective on their activities.
Thus, to the extent that one is concerned that public-law litigation is less
democratic than alternate modes of policymaking, one might find good
reason to prefer state litigation to analogous litigation by private parties. This
point comes with several essential caveats, however. The political and
national pressures bearing on state AGs may be a double-edged sword. As
we've shown, AG campaigns are a lot more expensive than they were in the
1990s, and the imperatives of campaign fundraising may push AGs to
espouse more extreme-or simply more consistently red or blue-positions.
The more general literature on polarization suggests, after all, that politicians
taking highly partisan positions may be responding more to funders than to
voters.328
Likewise, although one might hope that AGs consider the interests of
all citizens, AGs' incentives to do so are, at the very least, questionable.
Every state contains large numbers of both Republicans and Democrats, and
to the extent that state public-law litigation has a partisan slant, state citizens
not from the AG's party may strongly prefer that the litigation not be brought.
State AGs (or the governors who appoint them) are elected on the same at-
large, first-past-the-post system as other statewide officials, which
necessarily leaves the minority party unrepresented even where the margin
between majority and minority is small. 3 29 Even if high-profile public
lawsuits become campaign issues in AG elections-and they sometimes
do-AGs in many states may have little or no incentive to worry about the
327. In many instances, those responsibilities will constrict the opportunities for partisanship,
or dampen its effects. For example, aside from occasional high-profile exceptions, AGs typically
defend state legislation against constitutional attack, even if the legislation in question was the
handiwork of an opposite-party legislature and runs counter to the AGs' own policy preferences.
Similarly, Democratic AGs defend criminal convictions; Republican AGs defend civil rights or
environmental judgments-and so on. There may be cases to the contrary, and we do not know (and
do not purport to suggest) that Democrats and Republicans handle the day-to-day demands of the
job in precisely the same way. Nevertheless, there are likely to be large swaths of the job that lack
any particularly sharp partisan valence, and where the tensions between "states' interests" and
partisan interests is relatively easy to resolve.
328. See, e.g., BROWNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 327-38 (2007) (recounting the rise of"netroots"
organizations that raised large sums of money for Democrats and used their influence to push party
politicians to the Left).
329. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 38-45 (2017) (discussing the effects of first-past-the-
post rules).
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preferences of citizens from the other party.33 0 Representation of all the
states' citizens often depends on the partisan alignments in the state, which
will determine whether the AG must compete for the median voter or play to
her party base.
This representation problem is, of course, endemic to all unitary
decisionmakers elected on a winner-take-all basis. Many Republicans felt
shut out of government under the Obama Administration, just as many
Democrats do now. Federalism is a partial answer to that problem, as it gives
the national out-party the opportunity to control at least some states where it
remains a majority,3 3' and further decentralization may address it at the state
level.332 But we think the problem feels different when the relevant elected
official is a lawyer, and the people of the state are not just his constituents
but his clients. The interests (perhaps "preferences" is a better word in this
context) of Republicans and Democrats may in many instances be
irreconcilable, and it is probably impossible to ask an AG to "represent" all
the citizens in many scenarios. At the same time, we find it deeply
problematic for a lawyer purporting to act on behalf of all the state's citizens
to ignore the preferences of a large portion of them.3 3 3
At first blush, private class actions seem preferable on this score-
though here, too, matters prove to be more complicated than they first appear.
Just as AGs have an obligation to represent the "state," or "the people," or
"the public interest," so too class counsel are obligated to represent all the
330. We see some indications that AG elections involve different political dynamics from other
statewide offices. The fact that five of the last six governors of Massachusetts have been
Republicans suggests that state government races are competitive despite the State's all-Democrat
congressional delegation. But we are told that in fact, races for AG are not competitive, and the
record seems to bear this out: The last Republican AG of Massachusetts was Elliott Richardson,
who left the post in 1969. See Wikipedia, Massachusetts Attorney General, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wikilMassachusetts AttorneyGeneral [https://perma.cc/H2DW-SGFK] (showing political
affiliation of Massachusetts AGs dating back to 1702). Hence, current AG Maura Healy can feel
comfortable filing nearly a dozen lawsuits against the Trump Administration in 2017 alone
notwithstanding her Republican governor's 71% approval rating. David S. Bernstein, Maura
Healey's Trump Card, BOST. MAG. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bostonmagazine.com
/news/2018/01/30/maura-healey-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/F4RV-RN6G] (estimating that
Massachusetts AG Healy filed roughly fifteen lawsuits against the Trump Administration in 2017).
Why AG politics is so different from gubernatorial politics is a mystery to us, but that mystery is
outside the scope of this paper.
331. See, e.g., Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 79, at 1783 (noting "federalism can
be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing would-be dissenters to govern in some
subpart of a system"); Young, Dark Side, supra note 79, at 1286 (noting "the party that is 'out' in
Washington will almost certainly be 'in' in at least a couple of dozen states and literally thousands
of localities").
332. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 21-25 (2010) (arguing that federalism should encompass cities and local institutions).
333. See generally Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 110, at 489, 512-13, 546 (developing
these points and arguing that citizens should therefore not be bound by the judgments in
representative state actions).
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members of the class. The latter obligation is, at least in theory, easier to
enforce. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires judges in
class actions to ensure that class counsel can "fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the class." 33 4 The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he
adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest
between named parties and the class they seek to represent." 3 35 And if there
are conflicts of interest within the class, there are mechanisms to deal with
them. Rule 23(c)(5) permits a court to "divide[] [a class] into subclasses"336
when the class contains members "whose interests are divergent or
antagonistic." 3
The protections of Rule 23 may not help with the ideological conflicts
we have in mind, however. Class counsel is duty-bound to protect the
"interests" of absent class members, but-as we hinted above-there is a
difference between legal "interests" and "preferences" about law and policy.
Class action doctrine tends to conceive of interests in objective terms,
analogous to the goals embodied in substantive law. Thus, one might have an
"interest" in obtaining a certain form of relief if there is a colorable argument
that the law so provides; whether or not one actually wants that relief is
largely irrelevant to the adequacy-of-representation inquiry.338 Derrick Bell's
work on school-desegregation litigation provides an illustration. Bell's
account makes clear that many African-American families opposed such
litigation because they thought race-discrimination lawsuits should pursue
school quality over integration. But that kind of conflict-over how best to
understand the law and what to do about it-is not the kind of conflict of
interest that Rule 23 has in mind. On the contrary, as David Marcus has
explained, "[j]udges [in school-desegregation litigation] dealt with the
problem of conflicts in litigant preferences among class members by denying
their relevance. Really at stake, they reasoned, were group rights, and
individuals did not matter all that much." 3 39
This feature of class-action litigation has led some commentators to
search for means to make class-action litigation more "democratic," to take
better account of individual preferences. Bill Rubenstein, for example, has
suggested "[r]ules that require[] individuals or experts filing group-based
334. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(1)(B), (g)(4).
335. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
336. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5).
337. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, RICHARD L. MARCUS,
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790
(3d ed. Sept. 2018 update).
338. In damages class actions, the solution (in theory, at least) is to opt out. Thus, the problem
is most stark in "mandatory" injunctive class actions.
339. David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 690 (2011).
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cases to demonstrate that some level of community dialogue preceded the
decision to file, or to show some level of community participation in the
filing, or to establish approval for their filings from democratically elected
representatives."340 AGs are, of course, one category of democratically
elected representative. And while existing mechanisms of democratic
accountability for state AGs-including independent elections,
interdependent relationships with other arms of state government, and
various checking and transparency mechanisms grounded in state
constitutions and statutes-leave ample room for improvement, they
nevertheless remain an important advantage for state litigation as compared
to its private alternatives.
D. The Litigation Safeguards of Federalism
In assessing the role that state governments can play in public-law
litigation, it is also worthwhile to consider the impact of such litigation on
the states' role in our federal system. Writing in this vein, Daniel Francis has
argued that state litigation is one of the "political safeguards of
federalism."34 1 Just as Herbert Wechsler argued that states participate in
contemporary federalism through their representation in the national
legislative branch,3 42 and Heather Gerken, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, and Gillian
Metzger have contended that states protect their interests through their
bureaucratic interactions with the national executive,343 so Professor Francis
argues that states realize their role in modern federalism in part through
activity before the judicial branch.3 44
It is easy to appreciate these "litigation safeguards of federalism" when
states argue that the national government lacks power to intrude on state
policy choices.3 45 But the point extends to cases involving horizontal
conflicts among states, or cases in which states use litigation to protect their
citizens from business practices they deem harmful (or to protect businesses
from regulatory demands they deem harmful). Prior to the New Deal, states
presided over a purportedly exclusive sphere of state autonomy, and their
primary federalism interest was in guarding the boundaries of that sphere.
But we now live in an age of concurrent jurisdiction and cooperative
federalism, wherein states act in the same policy space as the national
340. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1652-53, 1659 (1997); see
also Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1185 (1982)
(arguing for "full disclosure of, although not necessarily deference to, class sentiment").
341. Francis, supra note 91, at 1026, 1040-41.
342. See Wechsler, supra note 87, at 543-44, 546.
343. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 90, at 1286.
344. See Francis, supra note 91, at 1048.
345. See supra section II(B)(1).
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government and, much of the time, serve as partners in the same regulatory
regimes.3 46 States therefore have an interest not just in safeguarding their
autonomy to act independently of the national government but also in
participating within the broader system of national policymaking and
implementation. As Professor Francis puts it, the institutional arrangements
of federalism must protect "the ability of the states to participate saliently in
governance, regulation, and political life, and to do so independently-that
is, neither with the prior permission nor at the direction of the federal
government."3 47
Litigation is one way that states can find a public forum to oppose,
support, or seek to shape national policy. As Professor Francis points out,
litigation has several advantages in this regard. Filing a lawsuit affords state
AGs the opportunity to force their concerns onto the national agenda, in a
public setting in which factual claims are submitted to adversarial testing and
where decision of the particular issue will not be "bundled" (as in elections)
with any number of other issues.348 Litigation also can clarify the lines of
accountability that the Supreme Court often says are critical to a well-
functioning federalism, by making clear which governments (or government
officials) are responsible for particular policies.349
In all these ways, litigation compares favorably to Professor Wechsler's
legislative representation in Congress (which may or may not actually care
about state institutional interests)3 50 and to forms of bureaucratic
"uncooperative federalism" (which are usually not very transparent or public,
and which may tend toward prolonged recalcitrance rather than legal
resolution). Most of these benefits, Francis emphasizes, are independent of
how the cases actually come out; the important point is the availability of the
courts as a public, responsive, and relatively level playing field for states to
articulate their views.5 1
346. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557
(2012) ("States do not rule separate and apart from the system.... [T)hey serve as part of a complex
amalgam of national, state, and local actors implementing federal policy."); Ernest A. Young, "The
Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, SUP. CT.
REV., 2011 at 253, 257-63 (tracing the change from dual federalism to an integrated system of
concurrent jurisdiction).
347. Francis, supra note 91, at 1033.
348. See id at 1044-45.
349. See id at 1051-54; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992)
(emphasizing the importance of clear lines of political accountability in federal systems).
350. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 951, 958-60 (2001) (contending that representation in Congress does
not protect states as institutions from federal aggrandizement); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C.
Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1459,
1477-78 (2001) (observing that temporary interests may prompt state representatives in Congress
to "sacrifice [states'] rights as institutions").
351. See Francis, supra note 91, at 1040-41.
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State litigation may thus be a valuable mechanism for state participation
in our federal system generally, without regard to the particular type of
lawsuit involved. Given their concurrent jurisdiction over regulatory matters
and involvement in cooperative federalism schemes, state governments are
important stakeholders in the national political process. In Albert
Hirschman's terms, vertical litigation protects states' right to "exit" that
process and pursue their own vision, while horizontal litigation is more like
"voice" within the national process.352 We do not say that litigation is always
or even mostly superior to other forms of involvement, such as political
representation in Congress, connections between state and national political
parties, the intergovernmental lobby, or bureaucratic consultation and
infighting.35 3 But federalism has always been about finding more than one
basket for one's eggs.
E. Judicialization and Backlash
State public-law litigation is not only more democratic than many forms
of private litigation; it may also be more powerful. As Part II explained, state
AGs enjoy various advantages in the litigation realm that may make state
public-law litigation more formidable, or simply more feasible, than its
private analogues-a consequence that will strike some observers as entirely
desirable and others as cause for regret. The key point for present purposes
is that there will not always be a private analog to state suits: state litigation
has a broader reach given the more expansive scope of state interests and the
favorable procedural rules for states.354
Consider questions of standing, for example. Even when AGs are
asserting the same sorts of interests as private parties, the scope of the state's
interests may be broader than those for the average individual or firm, due to
the breadth of states' activities and holdings. As we described above, states
can also establish standing based on interests that flow from their status as
governments-interests that lack any private equivalent. In the Texas
immigration case, for instance, it is difficult to imagine a private plaintiff who
could claim a concrete injury from the Obama Administration's deferred-
action programs. Similarly, some commentators have suggested that state
352. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4-5, 30 (1970) (defining "exit" and "voice" as alternative
courses of action when the quality of a regime declines).
353. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 116-17 (2009) (highlighting the intergovernmental
lobby); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 90, at 1255-56 (focusing on bureaucrats); Kramer,
supra note 87, at 219 (prioritizing political parties); Wechsler, supra note 87, at 543-44
(emphasizing representation in Congress).
354. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 123, at 572-78 (discussing
government advantages in litigation).
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AGs may be "the only plaintiffs who have a shot at standing" to pursue
Emoluments Clause challenges against President Trump.355 At the very least,
it seems clear that the AGs' theory-that the Emoluments Clauses were
"material inducements to the states entering the union," giving states an
interest in enforcing "the terms under which [they] participate[] in the federal
system"-would not be available to a private individual or group.356
AGs also can claim significant advantages when they sue on behalf of
individuals, as in parens patriae cases. Because State AGs need not file a
class action in order to represent their citizens, they are not bound by Rule 23
and can bring suit much more easily than can a class action attorney. The
tobacco cases are a prime example. Hundreds of private suits had foundered
on the shoals of class certification before the states stepped in. Among other
things, the states were able to avoid difficult questions of predominance that
doomed damages class actions requiring individualized evidence of injury or
causation.
In addition to these procedural benefits, AGs derive practical advantages
from their governmental status. AGs have investigatory powers, such as the
ability to issue subpoenas, that enable them to gather information from
potential adversaries in the absence of formal discovery.3 57 AGs also have
tools of publicity that may not be available to private parties and attorneys.
A press conference by a state AG, or group of AGs, is likely to carry more
weight and capture more attention than a statement by a private legal-
advocacy organization or class-action attorney.35s The publicity associated
with AG investigations and litigation may, in turn, enhance the leverage AGs
can bring to the bargaining table. And AGs have significant resources at their
disposal. Even if their budgets are limited (and in many states they are), AGs
355. Cogan Schneier, After Defeat in New York, State AGs Are Next to Test Emoluments
Challenge, NAT'L L.J. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites
/nationallawjournal/2018/01/24/after-defeat-in-new-york-state-ags-are-next-to-test-emoluments-
challenge/ [https://perma.cc/3YXQ-LGM6] (quoting James Tierney, former AG of Maine).
356. Complaint at 6-32, District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md.
June 12, 2017).
357. See, e.g., Stephanie Ebbert, Healey Wins Showdown with Exxon Mobil, BOSTON GLOBE
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/11/healey-wins-showdown-with-
exxon-mobil/HwActch6RI8WQVKdlflJ9I/story.html [https://perma.cc/9WE3-HDYF] (describing
Massachusetts AG's investigation of Exxon Mobil, which will compel Exxon to turn over "40 years
of documents" on the company's research on global warming).
358. See, e.g., Nolette, supra note 13, at 58-64 (describing how AG litigation shaped public
opinion and changed the political climate on pharmaceutical pricing); Sebok, supra note 117, at
2177-79 (describing shifts in public opinion on smoking after the multistate suit); see also Rachel
M. Cohen, The Hour of the Attorneys General, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://prospect.org/article/hour-attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/VXL7-BCB8] ("When a state
files a lawsuit, it invokes a special sort of gravitas that private entities don't have. And when ten, or
fifteen, or twenty states join together to sue a corporation or the federal government, it sends a
powerful message-something AGs rarely overlook.").
120 [Vol. 97:43
State Public-Law Litigation
can and often do team up with private attorneys with sizeable war chests. In
some cases, moreover, AG litigation has been subsidized by private
donations: for example, the red-state challenges to the ACA were financed
largely by a private lobbying organization. 359
All of this suggests that state public-law litigation may sweep more
broadly than litigation by private individuals and groups. It follows that as
state litigation increases, so too does the number of contentious policy issues
that will be resolved by litigation (and settlement) rather than via more
conventional political processes of legislation and regulation. Whether that
is a good or a bad thing depends, of course, on one's view of the appropriate
bounds of "adversarial legalism"-a question we do not purport to answer
here.
Instead, we want to make a somewhat different point. The advantages
that states currently enjoy in the litigation field are not set in stone, and they
could be trimmed back-by courts, by state legislators, or even by federal
law. Opponents of state standing already suggest that states should face
unique obstacles to standing that ordinary litigants need not confront. In the
Texas immigration case, for example, the United States asserted that Texas's
injury was "self-inflicted" and that it was somehow "offset" by benefits that
it would experience under the federal policy the state sought to challenge.3 60
But there is no general doctrine of self-inflicted injury or offsetting benefits
in standing law. Likewise, in Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme Court
suggested that state governments cannot assert parens patriae standing to
assert their citizens' federal constitutional rights in a suit against the national
government.361  That is not a disability that any private membership
organization would face, even though Mellon's assertion that the United
States itself is the primary representative of its citizens in federal matters
would seem to apply there as well.
State AGs also face potential backlash from others within state
government. State legislators have the power to slash AGs' budgets-as has
happened in our home state of North Carolina.3 62 Legislators might also
impose limitations (such as requirements of legislative or gubernatorial
approval) on AGs' ability to initiate suit. Or, to take another example from
359. Charles Elmore, Lobbying Group Picks Up Costs of Florida's Health-Care Legal
Challenge, PALM BEACH POST (Feb. 19, 2011), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/lobbying-
group-picks-costs-florida-health-care-legal-challenge/uy6qFUcLnID908WJyXsWSP/
[https://perma.cc/7NLT-SRAJ].
360. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 617, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
361. 262 U.S. 447,485-86 (1923). Mellon seems flatly inconsistent with Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 520-21 (2007), which allowed states to sue parens patriae to assert their citizens'
rights under the Clean Air Act. But that question is beyond the scope of our discussion here.
362. Anne Blythe, GOP Lawmakers Target Democrat Josh Stein with Surprise Budget Cuts,
NEWS & OBSERVER (June 21, 2017), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
govermment/state-politics/articlel57510939.html [https://perma.cc/RZH5-KPBJ].
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North Carolina, state legislators might attempt to assert control over the
conduct of certain categories of state litigation 363 or to vest litigation authority
in government attorneys outside the AGs' office. 36
Finally, we can imagine a variety of federal-law responses. As we have
noted, a significant number of federal statutes explicitly authorize state
governments to sue to enforce federal law, and where this is true, Congress
would be free to restrict or condition such suits as it sees fit. Likewise, states
sometimes avail themselves of broad general rights to sue under the APA and
similar laws, and these general rights could be modified to specify the
circumstances under which state AGs may sue. Because most state public-
law litigation is brought in federal court, the federal rules of procedure could
also be amended to limit the circumstances in which state governments may
file suits. And just as the "special solicitude" for states' standing under
Massachusetts v. EPA was ajudicial innovation, so too the federal courts may
decide to craft special limitations on state lawsuits. We would not rule out
the possibility that principles of constitutional federalism might limit federal
law's ability to systematically make it more difficult for states to file lawsuits
than other parties, but we suspect the range of action open to Congress and
the federal courts on this point is relatively broad.
That state legislatures, Congress, or the federal courts could limit state
lawsuits hardly means that they should. A central thrust of our argument has
been that state litigation is-on the whole-a uniquely valuable contribution
to national debate about matters of shared public concern. We think it would
be counterproductive to hamstring state AGs in the ways suggested above,
and we think that most concerns about contemporary litigation should be
directed at reforming public-law litigation generally, rather than focusing on
states.3 65 But we do worry that as states take a more prominent and aggressive
role in public-law litigation, AGs may invite a backlash that could limit their
authority. Indeed, the threat of such a backlash strikes us as directly related
to the themes of partisanship and polarization that we have explored in this
Article.366 To the extent that state litigation is viewed as "political" in a
pejorative sense, it may be especially vulnerable to retrenchment by political
363. See Act of June 28, 2017, ch. 57, sec. 6.7(l), § 120.32.6(b), 2017-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
1, 19 (LexisNexis) (vesting legislative leaders with "final decision-making authority" over the
litigation of cases in which the constitutionality of state law is challenged).
364. See Lemos, Democratic Enforcement, supra note 325, at 983-84 (describing arrangements
in some states in which specialized agencies control certain categories of litigation).
365. Justice Thomas, for example, has recently called for limiting nationwide injunctions. See
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Such injunctions
feature in many state lawsuits, see, e.g., id., but are not unique to them.
366. See Johnstone, supra note 47, at 609 (worrying that state AGs "cannot be part of the
solution to national partisan polarization . .. if those forces of polarization extend to the state
level"); Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics?,
52 U. RICH. L. REv. 633, 651 (2018) (worrying that the increasing frequency and polarized nature
of state litigation risks "cheapening the brand" of the states as litigants).
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opponents. And courts may refuse to extend favorable treatment to state
litigation if they come to see it as a form of political grandstanding, or if it
forces them to confront a host of divisive issues they would otherwise avoid.
We close, then, with two points about the future of state public-law
litigation. First, we want to sound a note of caution for AGs and others
involved in state public-law litigation. State AGs-like any other litigants-
have to balance the costs and benefits of potential litigation when deciding
whether to proceed. In the previous Part, we argued that the states' long-term
institutional interests deserve significant weight in that calculus, though they
will sometimes be trumped by competing imperatives. It bears emphasis that
the states' institutional interests include an interest in maintaining litigation
as a distinctive mode of state power. That interest will sometimes counsel
restraint, even when the short-term gains of successful litigation would be
sizeable.
Second, to the extent that new restrictions are proposed for state
litigation, those restrictions should be informed by a careful assessment of
the role that state public litigation plays in our federal system and our national
politics. We hope the analysis in this Article can contribute to that
assessment.
Conclusion
American federalism can be-and in fact nearly always has been-a
safety valve for political.and social divisions that might otherwise threaten
national unity. The states have contributed to the health of our body politic
in a wide variety of ways over the course of our history (and at other times
they have undermined it). While it seems unlikely that the Founders
envisioned the entrepreneurial state litigation of the past twenty years, such
litigation has become an important mechanism for state participation in
American politics. Like any other institutional feature of our government,
that litigation has upsides and downsides. Done right, however, we think state
public-law litigation can be a force for easing the political polarization that
afflicts our national politics.
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